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Abstract
One of the main challenges for autonomous spacecraft relative guidance and control is
extending the algorithms for autonomous rendezvous and docking (AR&D) operations to
multiple collaborative spacecraft.
In this thesis, the autonomous rendezvous problem, between two active spacecraft, is for-
mulated as a two player nonzero-sum differential game. The local-vertical local-horizontal
(LVLH) rotating reference frame is used to describe the dynamic of the game.
The State-Dependent Riccati equation (SDRE) method is applied to extend the Linear
Quadratic differential game theory to obtain a feedback control law for nonlinear equation
of relative motion. In the simulations both the spacecraft use continuous thrust engines. A
comparison among Pareto and Nash equilibrium has been performed.
A multiplayer sequential game strategy is used to extend the control law to many spacecraft
for relative motion synchronization in an on-orbit self assembly strategy.
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Sommario
Uno dei possibili sviluppi della guida e del controllo relativo nello spazio è quella di estendere
gli algoritmi per operazioni di rendezvous e di docking autonome a più veicoli spaziali che
collaborano tra di loro. Il problema del rendezvous tra due veicoli spaziali viene risolto
utilizzando la teoria dei giochi differenziali lineari quadratici. La dinamica del gioco viene
descritta in un sistema di riferimento cartesiano non inerziale.
Per estendere l’utilizzo della teoria dei giochi differenziali lineari quadratici alle equazioni
non lineari di moto relativo è stata utilizzata le tecnica di parametrizzazione in funzione
dello stato o linearizzazione estesa. Nelle simulazioni è stato valutato il confronto tra
le prestazioni e le traiettorie ottenute con l’equilibrio di Pareto e quello di Nash quando
entrambi i veicoli spaziali agiscono sotto spinta continua.
Una strategia sequenziale è stata utilizzata per estendere il gioco differenziali a più di due
giocatori per avere la sincronizzazione del moto relativo durante operazioni di assemblaggio
nello spazio.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Rendezvous problems between spacecraft have attracted an high research interest due to
their important applications in the actual space missions. Rendezvous problems can be
categorized into two groups depending on how the rendezvous maneuver is performed by the
participating spacecraft for a given mission: active-passive and cooperative maneuvers. In
an active-passive rendezvous problem involving two spacecraft, the first spacecraft, known
as the target, does not apply any control force while following its trajectory. The second
spacecraft, which serves as an active spacecraft, is controlled in order to meet the target.
The control objective for the active spacecraft is matching the position and the velocity
of the target spacecraft. On the contrary, in a cooperative rendezvous maneuver, both
spacecraft are controlled and guided to match the same position and velocity. Therefore,
the solutions to both rendezvous problems consist of a sequence of control maneuvers or
guidance laws, designed to bring the spacecraft to the same states, i.e., position and velocity.
Based on the overall mission requirements, the control objective of the rendezvous can
include additional constraints such as the total amount of propellant for each spacecraft or
the mission time.
The cooperative maneuver is formulated as two player nonzero-sum differential game. In a
nonzero-sum differential game the sum of the objective functions is not equal to zero. Two
possible strategies can be used: cooperative and noncooperative.
The typical solution of the noncooperative game is the well-know Nash equilibrium. Nash
equilibrium can be interpreted as a state where no player has intended to unilaterally
deviate from its strategy.
A typical solution of the cooperative game is called Pareto efficient solution. The so-called
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Pareto efficient solutions are based on the assumption that the cost any one specific player
incurs is not uniquely determined, rather the solution is determined when the cost incurred
by all players simultaneously cannot be improved.
For nonlinear dynamic the analytical solution of the two players game is complicated by
the resolution of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) partial differential equations. For a two-
player nonzero-sum Linear Quadratic (LQ) differential game the solution is reduced to solve
the matrix Riccati differential equations. The state-dependent Riccati equation (SDRE)
technique is the used method to solve the infinite horizon nonlinear differential game.
The thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 the space flight mechanics and orbital
elements are introduced. In the first section the two body problem and Keplerian motion
are discussed. In the second section the cartesian relative equation of motion are developed.
In Chapter 3 the classification of the game theory is reported and the solutions in the case
of two player nonzero-sum Linear Quadratic differential game theory for the cooperative
and noncooperative strategies is presented.
In Chapter 4 a SDRE method is used to solve a nonzero-sum differential game for the
spacecraft proximity operations and rendezvous. The dynamic of the spacecraft is expressed
in LVLH frame centered at an actual or a fictions spacecraft in an unperturbed orbit around
the Earth. Both spacecraft use a continuous thrust engine and the control is computed by
varying the thrust magnitude and the directions. The masses of the spacecraft varies with
the propellant consumption. A game time interval is fixed a priori and a perfect information
structure is assumed.
In Chapter 5 a hierarchical approach is used to extend the two player differential game
to multiple spacecraft for autonomous on-orbit assembly maneuvers. The simulation are
performed for cooperative game considering the nonlinear and linear equations of relative
motion.
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Chapter 2
Orbital Mechanics and Relative
Equations of Motion
In this chapter the orbital mechanics and relative equations of motion are introduced.
The first section, which has been developed by principally using [1, 48], deal with the two-
body problem and the mathematical and mechanical description of the threeKepler’s laws of
planetary motion. The inertial frame and the orbital elements are introduced as coordinate
system in order to describe the position of the satellite in orbit. The transformation from
the inertial frame to orbital elements and vice-versa is also described.
In the second section, the relative equations of motion in the cartesian reference frame are
developed principally by using [57]. The nonlinear relative equations of motion and the
linearization for small separation distance and circular orbit are introduced, in particular,
the virtual chief method and the approximation, described in [60], are also considered.
2.1 The Two-Body Problem
Let consider the motion of two point of masses in an inertial reference frame, then the
point of masses are attracted one to each other with a magnitude given by Newton’s Law
of Universal Gravitation
F =Gm1m2
r2
(2.1)
where G= 6.6726×10−11m3/Kg ·s2 is the universal gravitational constant, m1 and m2
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are the masses of the bodies and r is the distance between the centres of mass. Assuming
that the gravitational force is the only force acting on the two bodies, the equation of
motion for each body can be rewritten in vector form using the Newton’s Second Law
m1r¨1 =G
m1m2
r3
r, (2.2)
m2r¨2 =−Gm1m2
r3
r, (2.3)
where r = r1−r2 is the relative position of the bodies and an overdot ( ˙ ) is used to
represent a time derivative. The relative acceleration of the bodies is given by
r¨ = r¨1− r¨2 =−Gm1 +m2
r3
r. (2.4)
In case of motion of an artificial satellite around a planet (primary body), the satellite
mass is often negligible so, by defining the gravitational parameter µ = GM , where M is
the planet mass, the equation of relative motion (2.4) can be written as
r¨ =− µ
r3
r. (2.5)
The Equation (2.5) describes the Keplerian motion, that is the motion of a small sec-
ondary body around a primary body in absence of perturbation. Assuming that the primary
body is the Earth, the gravitational parameter becomes µ⊕ = 398 600 Km/s2, where the
astronomical symbol ⊕ has been introduced.
2.1.1 Keplerian Motion
The Keplerian motion is characterized by two mechanical properties:
• Conservation of Massless angular momentum
• Conservation of Energy
Satellite’s massless angular momentum vector is defined as
11
h= r×v (2.6)
where v = r˙. A left multiplication of the Equation (2.5) by cross product with r leads
to
r× r¨+r× µ
r3
r = 0 ⇐⇒ r× d
dt
v = 0 (2.7)
Left side of the previous equation can be written as
r× d
dt
v = d
dt
(r×v) = d
dt
h= 0. (2.8)
and, together with the Equation (2.7), it proves that h is constant. The vector h is
orthogonal to the vectors r and v so, being h a constant vector, the motion of the satellite
is on the plane. In this case, it is usual to refer to an orbital plane. The adopted relative
motion system is a conservative system and the sum of the kinetic and potential energies
remains constant. By multiplying the left side and right side of the Equation (2.5) by v = r˙
(dot product) and by substituting r¨ = v˙ the equation becomes
v˙ ·v+ µ
r3
r · r˙ = 0. (2.9)
Given a general vector w, the following relationship holds true
w · w˙ = w˙ ·w = d
dt
(
w ·w
2
)
= d
dt
w2
2 = w w˙ (2.10)
and the Equation (2.9) can be rewritten as
v v˙+ µ
r2
r˙ = 0. (2.11)
Being
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v v˙ = d
dt
(
v2
2
)
,
µ
r2
r˙ = d
dt
(
−µ
r
)
(2.12)
the Equation (2.11) becomes
d
dt
(
v2
2 −
µ
r
)
= 0. (2.13)
The total relative energy per unit mass is a constant on the satellite trajectory and it is
universally defined by the vis-viva form
E = v
2
2 −
µ
r
. (2.14)
The first term represents the relative kinetic energy while the second term represents
the gravity potential energy.
r
p
f
a ae
geometric center
periapsisapoapsis
line of apsides
Figure 2.1: Ellipse geometry.
Satellite’s trajectory equation may be obtained by the integration of the Equation (2.5)
or by using the constants of the relative motion. In according to Kepler’s first law of
planetary motion, all the possible trajectories are represented by the conic equation in
polar coordinates
r = p1 + ecosf (2.15)
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where p and e are respectively the semilatus rectum and the conic eccentricity and f is
the satellite’s true anomaly as shown in Fig.2.1. The semilatus rectum, when e 6= 1, can be
computed as using the following expression
p= a(1− e2) (2.16)
where a is the conic semi-major axis. It can be computed also as function of satellite’s
angular momentum, by using the following expression
p= h
2
µ
. (2.17)
The semi-major axis defines, together with the altitude h, the traditional classification
of the orbit around the Earth, as shown in Table 2.1. The eccentricity defines the type of
the conic and the orbit shape. The classification of the orbit shape, as a function of the
eccentricity, is reported in Table 2.2.
Table 2.1: Orbit’s classification
Classification h [Km] a [Km]
Low Earth Orbit (LEO) h < 800 a < 7178
Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) 800< h < 30 000 7178< a < 36 378
Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO) h∼= 35 768 a∼= 42 164
In orbital mechanics, the gravitating body is located at one of the conic foci, the so
called primary focus. The closest point to the gravitating body is the periapsis while the
farthest point is the apoapsis. The line connecting the periapsis to the apoapsis is called
the line of apsides, as shown in Fig.2.1.
The true anomaly f is measured from the periapsis and its time derivative can be
computed by using h. Let introduce a Cartesian coordinate system with a radial and
perpendicular unit vectors, respectively iˆr and iˆ⊥, as shown in Fig. 2.2. The position
vector can be rewritten as r = riˆr and its time derivative is the radial velocity vector
14
Table 2.2: Classification of the conic in function of the eccentricity.
Eccentricity Conic
e= 0 circumference
0< e < 1 ellipse
e= 1 parabola
e > 1 iperbola
x
y
iˆ?
iˆr
v
r
f
Figure 2.2: Radial end perpendicular unit vectors.
v = d
dt
r = r˙iˆr + r
d
dt
iˆr. (2.18)
Time derivative of radial unit vector can be computed by using satellite’s angular ve-
locity, that is oriented along the unit vector iˆθ = iˆr× iˆ⊥. Therefore,
d
dt
iˆr = f˙ iˆθ× iˆr = f˙ iˆ⊥ (2.19)
and the satellite’s velocity can be rewritten as
v = r˙iˆr + rf˙ iˆ⊥. (2.20)
So, the angular momentum of the satellite is
h= r×v = r2f˙ iˆθ (2.21)
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and the true anomaly is given by
f˙ = h
r2
. (2.22)
Since h is constant, Kepler’s second law of the planetary motion states that the relative
position vector r sweeps equal area in equals times that is a geometric property of the
conservation of the massless angular momentum and of the Equation (2.22) .
Other important quantities are the orbital period and the mean motion. The orbital period
is the time a satellite needs to make one complete orbit around the primary body and it is
given by the following expression
T = 2pi
√
a3
µ
. (2.23)
The Equation (2.23) verifies Kepler’s third law of planetary motion, being the square of
the orbital period proportional to the cube of the semi-major axis (mean distance between
primary and secondary focus). Satellite’s mean motion is the average angular speed in an
elliptic orbit and it is defined as
n= 2pi
T
=
√
µ
a3
. (2.24)
The Equation (2.15) provides an elegant closed-form expression for the radius as a
function of the true anomaly f . It is sometimes required to express the position as function
of the time. For this purpose,a relationship between true anomaly and time must be found.
However, a closed form relationship of the form f = f(t) does not exist. Time is therefore
introduced by using an auxiliary variable called eccentric anomaly E(f). The equation
relating the time to the eccentric anomaly is known as Kepler’s equation
M =M0 +n(t− t0) = E− esinE (2.25)
16
where M is the mean anomaly, t0 is the epoch and M0 is the mean anomaly at the
epoch. It is clear that the true anomaly is a function of a, e, t and M0. The relationship
between true anomaly and eccentric anomaly is the following
tan f2 =
√
1− e
1 + e tan
E
2 . (2.26)
2.1.2 Orbital Elements
A coordinate system must be introduced in order to describe the position of a satellite in
orbit. The geocentric reference frame usually referred to the Earth-centered Inertial (ECI)
is a Cartesian coordinate system ΓI(O;x,y,z). In this system, the origin O is located at the
center of the Earth, the fundamental plane (x,y) is the equatorial plane, the x axis point is
towards the first point of Arises, symbolized by Υ , the z axis goes through the geographic
North Pole and the y axis lies in equatorial plane and completes the orthogonal triad. The
unit vectors are indicated respectively with iˆ, jˆ and kˆ. By using a Cartesian reference
frame, the satellite position and velocity are described respectively by two R3 vectors: r
and v.
As in alternative, it is possible to use another set of six elements, called classical orbital
elements, in order to identify univocally the orbit and the position of the satellite on it.
This set is represented by the following elements
e= [ a e i Ω ω f ] (2.27)
where the first five elements are constant in case of Keplerian motion and represent the
shape, the size and the orientation of the orbit, while the sixth element locates the satellite
on orbit. The intersection between the orbital plane and the equatorial plane is called nodal
line. It intersects the satellite’s trajectories in two points: ascending node and descending
node. In the ascending node the satellite crosses the equatorial plane from south to north,
whereas in the descending node the plane is crossed from north to south. The unit vector
nˆ is defined as
17
kˆjˆ
iˆ
z
y
x
f
!
⌦
periapse
nodal line
⌥
i
Figure 2.3: Inertial frame and orbital elements.
nˆ= kˆ×h∥∥∥kˆ×h∥∥∥ . (2.28)
It has the same direction of the nodal line and it is centered in the primary focus and
points the ascending node. The eccentricity vector eˆ lies on the line that connects the
primary focus to the perhaps and it is defined by the following expression
eˆ= 1
µ
(v×h−µr
r
). (2.29)
The unit vector nˆ and the eccentricity vector eˆ are shown with the classical orbital
elements in Fig.1.
• Semi major axis a describes the size of the ellipse.
• Eccentricity e describes the shape of the ellipse.
• Inclination i ∈ [0,pi] is the angle between the orbital and equatorial plane.
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• Right ascension of the ascending node Ω∈ [0,pi] is the angle from vector iˆ to the nodal
line nˆ.
• Argument of perigee ω ∈ [0,2pi] is the angle from the ascending node to the perigee.
• True anomaly f ∈ [0,2pi] is the angle between the satellite’s current position and
perigee.
This set of parameters is affected by a series of singularities. In case of equatorial plane,
i.e. i = 0, Ω and ω are not defined. In case of circular orbit, the eccentricity vector is not
defined.
2.1.3 From ECI to Orbital Elements
The classical orbital elements (2.27) can be computed by using the position r and velocity
v vector of the satellite in ECI reference frame
(r,v) → [ a e i Ω ω f ] (2.30)
and the transformation is resumed in the following steps,
1. By using the Equation (2.14) of the total relative energy:
E = v ·v2 −
µ√
r ·r =−
µ
2a (2.31)
the semi-major axis can be computed as
a= µ2E =
µ
2µ√
r·r −v ·v
(2.32)
2. From (2.16) and (2.17) the eccentricity is computed by using the following expression
e=
√
1 + 2Eh
2
µ2
=
√
1 + 2E(r×v) · (r×v)
µ2
(2.33)
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3. The Inclination i can be computed by using the dot product between kˆ and h
cos i= kˆ ·h
h
⇐⇒ i= arccos
(
kˆ ·h
h
)
(2.34)
4. The same procedure can be followed for the right ascension of the ascending node Ω,
remembering that, unlike the inclination, Ω ∈ [0,2pi]
cosΩ = iˆ · nˆ ⇐⇒ Ω =

arccos
(ˆ
i · nˆ
)
if nˆ · jˆ > 0
2pi−arccos
(ˆ
i · nˆ
)
if nˆ · jˆ < 0
(2.35)
5. The argument of perigee ω can be computed by using the unit vectors eˆ and nˆ
cosω = nˆ · eˆ ⇐⇒ ω =

arccos(nˆ · eˆ) if eˆ · kˆ > 0
2pi−arccos(nˆ · eˆ) if eˆ · kˆ < 0
(2.36)
6. The true anomaly f can be computed as the angle between eˆ and the position unit
vector rˆ = r/r
cosf = eˆ · rˆ ⇐⇒ f =

arccos(eˆ · rˆ) if r ·v > 0
2pi−arccos(eˆ · rˆ) if r ·v < 0
(2.37)
2.1.4 From Orbital Elements to ECI
The inverse transformation, from orbital elements to the inertial position r and inertial
velocities v
[ a e i Ω ω f ] → (r,v) (2.38)
needs the definition of a new coordinate system, the perifocal reference frame, ΓP (O;xω,yω, zω).
The Perifocal coordinate system, shown in Fig.2.4, is centered in the primary focus. The
unit vectors Pˆ and Qˆ lie in the orbital plane with Pˆ point to the periapse. The unit vector
Wˆ has the same direction of the angular momentum h while Qˆ completes the coordinate
system. The satellite’s position vector has the following expression
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Figure 2.4: Perifocal reference frame.
r = r cosfPˆ + r sinfQˆ (2.39)
where r is computed by using the Equations (2.15) and (2.16). The vector r in the
Perifocal coordinate system has the following expression
[r]ΓP = r

cosf
sinf
0
=
a(1− e2)
1 + ecosf

cosf
sinf
0
 . (2.40)
In case of Keplerian motion the orbit does not change in time and the Perifocal coordi-
nate system becomes inertial
d
dt
Pˆ = d
dt
Qˆ= 0. (2.41)
The velocity vector v in the Perifocal coordinate system can be computed as the time
derivative of the Equation 2.39,
v = dr
dt
= (r˙ cosf − rf˙ sinf)Pˆ + (r˙ sinf + rf˙ cosf)Qˆ. (2.42)
Time derivative of the conic Equation (2.15) is the following
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r˙ = ∂r
∂f
f˙ = p(e+ sinf)(1 + ecosf)2 f˙ =
rf˙(esinf)
1 + ecosf , (2.43)
and by using (2.17) and (2.22), it is possible to obtain the expression of r˙ as a function
of the orbital parameters
r˙ =
√
µp esinf
r(1 + ecosf) =
√
µ
p
esinf. (2.44)
By substituting the Equation (2.44) in the Equation (2.43) the expression of rf˙ becomes
the following
rf˙ =
√
µ
p
(1 + ecosf). (2.45)
By substituting Equations (2.44)-(2.45) in the Equation (2.42), the expression of satel-
lite’s velocity vector v in the Perifocal frame is computed
[v]ΓP =
√
µ
p

−sinf
e+ cosf
0
 . (2.46)
Finally, the position and velocity vectors in the ECI reference frame are computed by
using the coordinate change matrix T(i,Ω,ω) : ΓI → ΓP and
[r]ΓI = T(i,Ω,ω)
T[r]ΓP ,
[v]ΓI = T(i,Ω,ω)
T[v]ΓP .
(2.47)
where the transformation matrix is computed as a composition of an elementary rotation
matrix
T(i,Ω,ω) = Tz(ω)Tx(i)Tz(Ω), (2.48)
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Tx(α) =

1 0 0
0 cosα sinα
0 −sinα cosα
 , Ty(α) =

cosα 0 −sinα
0 1 0
sinα 0 cosα
 ,
Tz(α) =

cosα sinα 0
−sinα cosα 0
0 0 1
 .
(2.49)
2.2 Relative Equation of Motion
A mathematical model of the relative motion describing the relative position and velocity
of a spacecraft is needed to control the rendezvous and docking maneuvers. The Cartesian
equations of the relative motion is the most used form. Starting from the most general
vectorial expression, the nonlinear equation of relative motion are developed. Three linear
approximations, in function of the relative distance and of the eccentricity value, are de-
scribed.
In the following, let consider two spacecraft orbiting a common primary. The target space-
craft will be termed chief and the follower will be referred as deputy. It is not necessary
that the chief position actually be occupied by a physical spacecraft. Sometimes the chief
position is simply used as an orbiting reference point about which the deputy spacecraft
orbit. The deputy and its parameters will be referred by using the subscript d.
2.2.1 Nonlinear Equation of Relative Motion (NERM)
The relative equation of motion is conveniently described in a Local-Vertical-Local-Horizontal
(LVLH) frame, as shown in Fig. 2.5, also known as Hill frame, ΓH(O;x,y,z). The origin
of LVLH frame is attached to the chief’s center of mass and its orientation is given by the
following unit vectors
iˆ= r/r, jˆ = kˆ× iˆ, kˆ = h/h. (2.50)
The vector iˆ is in the orbit radius direction, while kˆ is parallel to the orbit momentum
vector in the orbit normal direction. The vector jˆ then completes the right-handed coordi-
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Figure 2.5: Local-Vertical-Local-Horizontal (LVLH) frame.
nates system. The LVLH frame rotates as the chief rotates around the primary body and
consequently it is a non-inertial frame. The deputy motion in this frame is divided in two
components: the in-plane motion, along iˆ and jˆ, and the out-of-plane motion along kˆ.
The deputy’s relative position with respect to the chief is expressed in the LVLH frame as
ρ= xiˆ+yjˆ+ zkˆ. (2.51)
The deputy satellite position vector is written in the LVLH frame as
rd = rc+ρ= (rc+x)iˆ+yjˆ+ zkˆ, (2.52)
where rc is the orbit radius of the chief satellite. The distance of the deputy from the
chief is given by
rd =
√
(r+x)2 +y2 + z2. (2.53)
Denoting with ω and ω˙ the angular velocity and acceleration of the LVLH frame with
respect to the ECI frame, where the dot operator indicates the time derivative in the
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moving frame LVLH, the deputy’s velocity in the inertial frame ΓI is computed as the time
derivative of the Equation (2.52) as
d
dt
rd =
d
dt
rc+
d
dt
ρ= d
dt
rc+ ρ˙+ω×ρ (2.54)
Further derivative of the previous equation leads to the deputy’s vectorial equation of
motion
d2
dt2
rd =
d2
dt2
r+ d
dt
(ρ˙+ω×ρ) = (2.55)
= d
2
dt2
r+ d
dt
ρ˙+ d
dt
ω×ρ+ω× d
dt
ρ (2.56)
= d
2
dt2
r+ ρ¨+ω× ρ˙+ ω˙×ρ+ω× (ρ˙+ω×ρ) (2.57)
= d
2
dt2
r+ ρ¨+ 2ω× ρ˙+ ω˙×ρ+ω× (ω×ρ). (2.58)
Under the setup of the Keplerian two-body problem the angular velocity and acceleration
of the LVLH frame are given by
ω = f˙ kˆ, (2.59)
ω˙ = f¨ kˆ =−2f˙ r˙
r
kˆ. (2.60)
and, by substituting the terms (2.59) and (2.60) in the Equation (2.58)
r¨d = r¨iˆ+ f¨ kˆ×
(
xiˆ+yjˆ+ zkˆ
)
+ f˙ kˆ×
(
f˙ kˆ×
(
xiˆ+yjˆ+ zkˆ
))
+ 2f˙ kˆ×
(
x˙iˆ+ y˙jˆ+ z˙kˆ
)
+
(
x¨iˆ+ y¨jˆ+ z¨kˆ
)
= r¨iˆ+ f¨xjˆ− f¨yiˆ− f˙2xiˆ− f˙2yjˆ+ 2x˙f˙ jˆ−2y˙f˙ iˆ+ x¨iˆ+ y¨jˆ+ z¨kˆ
=
(
r¨− f¨y− f˙2x−2y˙f˙ + x¨
)
iˆ+
(
f¨x− f˙2y+ 2x˙f˙ + y¨
)
jˆ+ z¨.kˆ
(2.61)
The chief’s position in the LVLH frame is given by r = riˆ while the chief’s acceleration
(2.5) can be written as
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r¨ =− µ
r2
. (2.62)
and byubstituting (2.62) in the Equation (2.61) the following expression is achieved
r¨d =
(
− µ
r2
− f¨y− f˙2x−2y˙f˙ + x¨
)
iˆ+
(
f¨x− f˙2y+ 2x˙f˙ + y¨
)
jˆ+ z¨kˆ. (2.63)
Let consider the deputy’s Keplerian motion (2.5), where the control vector u has been
introduced,
r¨d =− µ
r3d
rd+u, (2.64)
and the deputy’s position vector in the LVLH frame (2.52), then the NonLinear Equation
of Relative Motion (NERM) can be written as
x¨= 2f˙
(
y˙− r˙
r
y
)
+ f˙2x+ µ
r2
− µ
r3d
(r+x) +ux
y¨ =−2f˙
(
x˙− r˙
r
x
)
+ f˙2y− µ
r3d
y+uy
z¨ =− µ
r3d
z+uz.
(2.65)
The only assumption which has been done is that both satellites obeyed Keplerian
motion. This relative equation of motion is valid for arbitrarily large relative orbits and the
chief orbit may be eccentric. The equations are nonlinear time-varying with time-varying
coefficients r, r˙, and f˙ . The deputy’s position, relative to the chief’s position, in the LVLH
frame can be controlled. The system can be written in state space form, nonlinear in the
state x defined as
x=
[
x y z x˙ y˙ z˙
]
(2.66)
and affine in control input u defined as
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u=
[
ux uy uz
]
. (2.67)
2.2.2 Linear Equation of Relative Motion (LERM)
The NERM (2.65) can be linearized if the relative orbit coordinates are smaller than the
chief orbit radius, i.e. ρ r. The deputy’s orbit radius can be linearized, neglecting high
order terms,
rd =
√
(r+x)2 +y2 + z2
= r
√
1 + 2x
r
+ x
2 +y2 + z2
r2
≈ r
√
1 + 2x
r
≈ r
(
1 + x
r
)
(2.68)
by considering (1+α)n≈ 1+nα with α 1 in the last step. The Equation (2.68) allows
to write the deputy gravitational acceleration in the following form
µ
r3d
= µ
r3d
(
(r+x)iˆ+yjˆ+ zkˆ
)
≈ µ
r3
(
1− 3x
r
)(
(r+x)iˆ+yjˆ+ zkˆ
)
≈
((
(r−2x)iˆ+yjˆ+ zkˆ
))
=
(
µ
r2
−2 µ
r3
x
)
iˆ+ µ
r3
yjˆ+ µ
r3
zkˆ
=
(
µ
r2
−2r
p
f˙2x
)
iˆ+ r
p
f˙2yjˆ+ r
p
f˙2kˆ
(2.69)
By substituting the Equation (2.69) in the Equation (2.65), the Linear Equation of
Relative Motion (LERM) can be written as
x¨= f˙2
(
1 + 2r
p
)
x+ 2f˙
(
y˙− r˙
r
y
)
+ux
y¨ =−2f˙
(
x˙− r˙
r
x
)
+ f˙2
(
1− r
p
)
y+uy
z¨ =−r
p
f˙2z+uz
(2.70)
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In the state space form the LERM is given by the following expression
x˙L =AL(t)xL+Bu(t) (2.71)
where
AL =
 0 I
ALρ˙ρ A
L
ρ˙ρ˙
 (2.72)
ALρ˙ρ =

f˙2
(
1 + 2 rp
)
−2f˙ r˙r 0
2f˙ r˙r f˙
2
(
1− rp
)
0
0 0 −f˙2 rp
 , ALρ˙ρ˙ =

0 2f˙ 0
−2f˙ 0 0
0 0 0
 . (2.73)
By using the only assumption of the small separation distances between the chief and
deputy, the NERM (2.65) can be linearized and the system becomes linear but remains
time-variant. This set of equations were used for the first time by Clohessy and Wiltshire
in 1960 to study a terminal guidance for satellite rendezvous problems[15].
2.2.3 Hill-Clohessy-Wiltshire (HCW) Equation
A further simplification can be obtained by assuming that the chief’s orbit is circular, then
e= 0 and p= r and the chief’s orbital radius r is constant. The true anomaly rate f˙ (2.22)
is constant and it is equal to the mean orbital rate (2.24),
f˙ = h
r2
=
√
µp
p2
=
√
µ
p3
=
√
µ
a3
= n (2.74)
where a is the chief’s semi-major axis. The relative equation of motion, reduced to the
simple form known as Hill-Clohessy-Wiltshire (CW) equations, are achieved
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x¨= 3n2x+ 2ny˙+ux
y¨ =−2nx˙+uy
z¨ =−n2z+uz.
(2.75)
The HCW equations in state space form are given by the following
x˙H =AHxH +Bu(t) (2.76)
where
AH =
 0 I
AHρ˙ρ A
H
ρ˙ρ˙
 (2.77)
AHρ˙ρ =

3n2 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 −n2
 , AHρ˙ρ˙ =

0 2n 0
−2n 0 0
0 0 0
 (2.78)
These equations of motion are valid only in case the chief orbit is circular and the
relative coordinates (x,y,z) are smaller than the chief orbit radius r. This set of equations
forms a linear time-invariant system, allowing to find a closed form solution to the relative
equations of motion and allowing the design of a linear optimal controller.
These equations were introduced in [27]. In this work, dated 1878, Hill studied the motion
of the Moon around the Earth, inspired by Euler’s “Theoria motuum lunae nova methodo
pertractata” of 1772 [22].
2.2.4 Virtual Chief Method
In the virtual chief (VC) method [60], a fictional satellite with zero eccentricity is used as
the chief satellite for the HCW equations, with both the actual chief and the deputy satellite
treated as deputies. This virtual chief satellite is a circularized version of the actual chief
satellite and it is defined by setting its eccentricity to zero and all orbital element values
equals to those of the chief:
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aV C = a
eV C = 0
iV C = i
ΩV C =Ω
ωV C = ω
fV C =MV C =M.
(2.79)
The subscript VC refers to the virtual chief satellite. The definitions of the fV C and ωV C
are arbitrary because the virtual chief’s orbit is circular. The virtual chief’s LVLH frame
has a constant angular velocity, unlike the chief’s LVLH frame. The three satellites are
illustrated in Fig. 2.6. The motion of both the chief and the deputy relative to the virtual
chief can be described by using the HCW equations being the virtual chief’s orbit circular.
The motion of the deputy relative to the real chief is the difference of these solutions.
⇢
f
virtual chief
chief
deputy
LVLH
Hill
fV C =M
Earth
(a) Virtual-chief, chief, and deputy satellite
⇢
f
chief
deputy
LVLH
Hill
Earth
f  M
(b) Virtual-chief and chief coordinate frames.
Figure 2.6: Virtual-chief method.
Let define the state vector for the motion of the deputy and the real chief relative to
the virtual chief respectively as
xD =
 [ρD]V C
[ρ˙D]V C
 , xC =
 [ρC ]V C
[ρ˙C ]V C
 , (2.80)
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where []V C indicates the coordination in the virtual chief’s LVLH frame. Due to the
circularity of the virtual chief’s orbit, each of these states evolves according to the HCW
equations:
xD(t) = eAH(t−t0)xD(t0), xC(t) = eAH(t−t0)xC(t0) (2.81)
The motion of the deputy relative to the real chief satellite is the difference of these
solutions:
xV C(t) = xD(t)−xC(t) = eAH(t−t0)x(t0). (2.82)
As the VC state vector x is defined with respect to the virtual chief’s LVLH frame,
a coordinate transformation is necessary in order to obtain the VC solution for the state
vector x in the actual chief’s frame. Only the in-plane motion is transformed as the chief
and virtual chief are coplanar. Regarding the position components, the coordinate trans-
formation is a rotation in the chief’s orbital plane by the difference between the chief’s true
anomaly and the chief’s mean anomaly (which is equal to the virtual chi’s true anomaly),
f −M ,
[ρ] =RC/V C [ρ]V C (2.83)
where the rotation is
RC/V C =

cos(f −M) sin(f −M) 0
−sin(f −M) cos(f −M) 0
0 0 1
 (2.84)
In order to convert the velocity components, the angular velocity of the virtual chief’s
frame relative to the chief’s frame is used. It has components ω1 = ω2 = 0 and ω3 = n− f˙
and the velocity in actual chief’s frame is
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[ρ˙] =RC/V C([ρ˙]V C +ΩV C/C [ρ]V C) (2.85)
where the skew-symmetric matrix of the angular velocity of the VC’s LVLH frame
relative to the actual chief’s LVLH frame is
ΩV C/C =

0 f˙ −n 0
n− f˙ 0 0
0 0 0
 (2.86)
By combining Equation (2.83) and Equation (2.85) the VC solution, given an initial
condition x0, can be written as
x(t) = PV C(t)eAH(t−t0)P−1V C(t0)x0 (2.87)
where the transformation matrix is
PV C(t) =
 RC/V C 0
RC/V CΩV C/C RC/V C
 (2.88)
The evaluation of the VC solution does not require the propagation of the virtual chief’s
position but it only requires the knowledge of the orientation of the virtual chief’s frame.
The VC method can be seen as the relative motion in a constant angular velocity frame
attached to the chief which is more consistent with HCW assumption.
2.2.4.1 Virtual-Chief Equation
By differentiating the Equation (2.87), the set of governing equations for the VC solution
can be computed [61],
x˙= (P˙V CeAH(t−t0) +PV CAHeAH(t−t0))P−1V C(t0)x0
= (P˙V C +PV CAH)eAH(t−t0)P−1V C(t0)x0.
(2.89)
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The matrix AV C(t) is defined such that AV CPV C = P˙V C +PV CAH . The substitution
in the previous equation leads to the VC equation
x˙=AV CPV CeA(t−t0)P−1V C(t0)x0 =AV Cx (2.90)
where
AV C = P˙V CP−1V C +PV CAHP
−1
V C . (2.91)
In order to compute the matrix AV C(t) the following matrices are evaluated
P˙V C =
 R˙V C 0
R˙C/V CΩV C/C +RC/V CΩ˙V C/C R˙C/V C
 (2.92)
Ω˙V C/C =

0 f¨ 0
−f¨ 0 0
0 0 0
 (2.93)
Noting that R˙C/V C =ΩV C/CRC/V C andRC/V CΩV C/CRTC/V C =ΩV C/C , the first term
on the right-hand side of the Equation (2.91) can be written as
P˙V CP
−1
V C =
 ΩV C/C 0
RC/V CΩ˙V C/CR
T
C/V C ΩV C/C
 . (2.94)
The second term on the right-hand side of the Equation (2.91) is
PV CAHP
−1
V C =
 −ΩV C/C I
RC/V C(−Ω2V C/C +AHρ˙ρ−AHρ˙ρ˙ΩV C/C)RTC/V C ΩV C/C +RC/V CAHρ˙ρ˙RTC/V C

(2.95)
Finally, by computing the Equation (2.91) and by considering the Equations (2.94) and
(2.95), the VC equations in state space form, where the control vector u is introduced, are
the following
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x˙V C(t) =AV C(t)xV C +Bu(t) (2.96)
where
AV C(t) =
 0 I
AV Cρ˙ρ A
V C
ρ˙ρ˙
 , (2.97)
where
AV Cρ˙ρ =

f˙2 +n2(3cos2 (f −M)−1) f¨ − 32n2 sin(2(f −M)) 0
−f¨ − 32n2 sin(2(f −M)) f˙2 +n2(3sin2 (f −M)−1) 0
0 0 −n2
 , AV Cρ˙ρ˙ =ALρ˙ρ˙.
(2.98)
The out-of-plane components for the VC equations and HCW equations are identical.
For in-plane components, the VC does not exactly reproduce the LERM, because of the
differences in AV Cρ˙ρ and ALρ˙ρ. For zero chief eccentricity, AV Cρ˙ρ and ALρ˙ρ are both equal to
AHρ˙ρ. For low eccentricities, AV Cρ˙ρ can be considered as an approximation of ALρ˙ρ.
The VC’s dynamic matrix equationsAV C(t) share with the LERM’s dynamic matrixAL(t),
the property of being time periodic with the chief’s orbital period. The Equation (2.87)
can be recognized as a solution of the VC equations by Lyapunov-Floquet transformation.
The periodic transformation PV C is a Lyapunov-Floquet transformation that relates the
VC equations to an underlying set of linear time-invariant equations, which are the HCW
equations. A Lyapunov-Floquet transformation for the LERM, that is also transformed
into HCW equations, is applied in [60, 62].
2.2.5 Calculation of the Initial Conditions
The propagation of the relative equations of motion requires a set of initial conditions.
The position and the velocity of the deputy relative to the chief are related to the inertial
position and velocity of each satellite through the following kinematic relationship
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[ρ] =RC/I([rD]I − [r]I), [ρ˙] =RC/I([vD]I − [v]I)− [ΩC/I ][ρ] (2.99)
where r and rD are the inertial position vectors, v and vD are respectively the iner-
tial velocities of the chief and deputy satellite. The skew-symmetric matrix of the angular
velocity of the chief’s LVLH frame relative to the inertial frame is given by ΩC/I and the
rotation matrix from the inertial-frame to chief’s LVLH frame is given by RC/I . The nota-
tion [ ]I indicates the coordination in inertial frame.The initial conditions in inertial frame
of the chief and deputy satellite are computed by using the orbital elements, introduced in
Subsection 2.1.2, and the transformation, introduced in Subsection 2.1.4.
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Chapter 3
Nonzero-sum Linear Quadratic
Differential Game
The game theory was originated from economics and widely applied in many areas such as
control system engineering, military and aerospace engineering, power systems, communi-
cation networks and biomedical science. The game theory deals with strategic interactions
among multiple decision makers called players or, in some contexts, agents. The player’s
objective is captured in a cost function which the players either minimize or maximize.
The decision is called the player’s strategy. In the game, a set that contains all the possible
strategies, that the players can choose from, is called the player’s admissible strategies.
In the first section of this chapter, a classification of the game theory is described as a
function of the time dependence strategy, the cooperation, the strategy making sequence
and the relationship between the players. The differential game theory is a subclass of the
game theory.
In the second section, a mathematical description of the two player’ nonzero-sum differen-
tial games is introduced and the most useful information structures for the game strategies
are described.
In the third section, the so-called linear quadratic (LQ) differential games are considered
and the solution of the cooperative and noncooperative nonzero-sum differential game is
shown in the feedback information games. The optimal control theory play an important
role in order to solve the differential games and the most important concepts are resumed.
The theory here illustrated is based principally on [21], where the LQ differential games are
deeply treated. In the last section, the architectures of formation flight [56] and relative
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guidance optimal control problem [54] are presented. Then, a collaborative spacecraft con-
trol problem is considered and the relationship with differential game is discussed. Finally,
a literary review on differential game in orbit is discussed.
3.1 Game theory Classification
A typical classification of the games is introduced in [7] and it is the following:
• Time dependence strategy: Static and dynamic games.
In a static game, every player makes only one-shot strategy. Moreover, in case of
a two-player static game, if every player’s admissible strategy set contains a finite
number of strategies, the game is also called a matrix game.
In a dynamic game, the decision process evolves in time, with more than one player
each one with its own cost function and possibly having access to different informa-
tions. A subclass of the dynamic games is the differential game. A set of differential
equations models the main dynamical features of the players’ environment and con-
tains a set of control inputs. The input function models the effect of the action taken
by players in the environment during the the game. The players’ objectives are for-
malized as a cost function which has to be minimized. Since the minimization has to
be performed subject to the dynamic model of the environment, the differential game
theory is a generalization of the optimal control theory. While the optimal control
problem has a clear definition of optimality, the concept of optimality in game theory
is not well-defined. In an optimal control problem, the optimal solution guarantees
that the cost is minimized in order to satisfy all the constraints, while in a differential
game, in general, the minimum cost of each player cannot be obtained simultaneously.
The minimization of the cost function of one player interferes with the minimization
of the other players and vice versa. Specific forms of optimality for differential games
can be defined in terms of equilibrium solution.
• The amount of cooperation: Noncooperative and Cooperative differential games.
In a noncooperative game, every player is assumed just to focus on pursuing its own
objective and not to collaborate with others. A typical solution to noncooperative
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game is the well-know Nash equilibrium. Nash equilibrium can be interpreted as a
state where no player has intended to unilaterally deviate from its strategy but if it
does so, then a loss will occur in its objective function. Therefore, Nash equilibrium
can be considered as a “safe” solution. Nash equilibrium can be obtained by utilizing
the standard static optimization technique for the static game and by utilizing the
optimal control theory for the dynamic game. The existence or uniqueness of Nash
equilibrium for noncooperative game is not always guaranteed.
In a cooperative game, although, individual players have their own objective, in fact
they are assumed to collaborate one to each other to jointly improve their objective
functions. Therefore, a cooperative game is also considered as a multi-objective opti-
mization problem. A typical solution of the cooperative game is called Pareto efficient
solution. The so-called Pareto efficient solutions are based on the assumption that
the cost any one specific player incurs is not uniquely determined, rather the solu-
tion is determined when the cost incurred by all players simultaneously cannot be
improved. In order to obtain Pareto efficient solution, a single optimization problem
needs be solved with the objective function being a convex combination of all the
players’ objective functions. Pareto frontier can be generated for all the different
choices of convex parameters.
• Strategy making sequence: Nash and Stackelberg Noncooperative games. In Nash
game, all the players make decisions simultaneously while in Stackelberg game, there
exists a sequence of decision making. Firstly, the leaders make a decision and then
they announce their strategies to the other players. The followers make decision to
react to the leaders’ strategies in a optimal way. Knowing that the followers react op-
timally, the leader naturally announce the strategy that should optimize own objective
function. The players’ strategies are said to be Stackelberg strategies. Clearly, the
leaders in Stackelberg game have the advantage over the followers under the condition
that they have to know the objectives of all the followers.
• Relationship among the players’ cost functions: Zero-sum and Nonzero-sum
games. In a zero-sum game the sum of all players’ objective functions is equal to
zero. Therefore the total gain in some players’ objective function is equal to the total
loss in other players’ objective functions. In a zero-sum game, Nash equilibrium is
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also known as a saddle-point solution. A typical example of the zero-sum game is
the one-pursuer one-evader game where the pursuer tries to minimize the distance
between the evader and itself at the terminal time, while the evader tries to maximize
such a distance.
In a nonzero-sum game the sum of all players’ objective function is not equal to zero.
In this chapter the attention is focus on the differential game.
3.2 Literary review
The differential game theory was introduced by Isaacs in 1950 with major application in
military situations and pursuit evasion game. The book [30] focuses on the zero-sum dif-
ferential games where the well-known Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs partial differential equation,
for deriving the feedback Nash Strategy, is proposed. One of the most important work on
nonzero-sum games is [66] where Nash equilibrium, the minmax solution and the noninfe-
rior solution (later known as Pareto solution) are discussed for static games and differential
games. Nash equilibrium of the nonzero-sum linear quadratic game is obtained by solving
the coupled differential matrix Riccati equations. In [4, 25, 45] the uniqueness and the
existence of Nash equilibrium for the linear quadratic games are studied.
In parallel with the research on differential Nash games, there exist many research works on
differential Stackelberg games. Static and differential Stackelberg game is investigated in
[63, 64]. In [63], Stackelberg solution is derived for linear quadratic differential games. . In
[64], the important property of Stackelberg solution, that is the inconsistency, is discussed
and it has been shown that the well-known Bellman’s optimality principle does not hold
for Stackelberg games. The existence and uniqueness of the differential game Stackelberg
solution are further studied in [5, 24, 47, 52, 70]. After 1980, the research works started
focusing on the potential applications of the differential game theory to all kinds of real
life. In [6], the idea of differential game theory is successfully applied to the H∞ robust
optimal control design problem where the designer is considered as one player and the noise
as the other player. In [58] the consensus problem is formulated and solved as a cooperative
differential game. In [67] the online solution for the differential games is considered by using
the reinforcement learning.
Among a variety of interesting applications of the differential game theory, the pursuit-
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evasion game has been widely studied. The pursuit-evasion game is solved, as Nash equi-
librium strategies in [66], and, as an example of leader-follower Stackelberg strategies, in
[63]. In [23] a two-pursuer one-evader game is considered and solved. A multi-player
pursuit-evasion game with evaders having speed higher than the pursuers is considered in
[69, 71]. The conventional multi-player pursuit-evasion games assumes that either the pur-
suers or the evaders are able to have global information of the system. The multi-player
pursuit-evasion games with incomplete information were investigated in [3, 8]. In [10] there
is a survey on a pursuit-evasion game.
3.3 Two-player Differential Game
A two-player differential game is defined as a game where the evolution of the state is given
by a dynamic system
x˙(t) = f(x,u1(t),u2(t)), x(t0) = x0 (3.1)
where the vector x(t) ∈ Rn is the state of the game and u1(t) ∈ U1 ⊆ Rm1 and u2(t) ∈
U2 ⊆ Rm2 are two independent control inputs. Each control input is assigned to a player,
such that u1(t) is designed by Player 1 and u2(t) is designed by Player 2. Given an initial
condition x0, each player chooses its control strategy in such a way that it minimizes the
corresponding cost functions
J1(u1,u2) = φ1(t0, tf ,x0,xf ) +
∫ tf
0
L1(x,u1,u2, t)dt, (3.2a)
J2(u1,u2) = φ2(t0, tf ,x0,xf ) +
∫ tf
0
L2(x,u1,u2, t)dt. (3.2b)
Denoting the information of the game available to each player with η1(t) and η2(t),
t ∈ [0, tf ] and the set of strategies that the players like to choose with Γ1 and Γ2, then the
standard information structures in differential game are defined as follows
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• Open-loop information pattern
η1(t) = {x0}, t ∈ [0, tf ],
η2(t) = {x0}, t ∈ [0, tf ].
Each player observes the initial condition of the others and picks an open-loop control:
u1(t) : [0,∞)→ U1 and u2(t) : [0,∞)→ U2 respectively. During the evolution of the
system, the players cannot change their control.
• Feedback state information pattern
η1(t) = {x(t)}, t ∈ [0, tf ],
η2(t) = {x(t)}, t ∈ [0, tf ].
Each player picks a closed loop control (that depends on the trajectory of the system,
i.e., the other player’s control input) Γ1(t,x) : [0,∞)×X→ U1 and Γ2(t,x) : [0,∞)×
X→U2 respectively. That is, players can adjust their controls depending on the state
of the system.
Then, the control inputs of the players are determined by the relations
u1 = γ1(η1) where γ1 ∈ Γ1,
u2 = γ2(η2) where γ2 ∈ Γ2.
For nonlinear dynamic (3.1) the analytical solution of two-player game is complicated
by the resolution of a set of coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) partial differential
equations, where the solution may be non-smooth or intractable. In a Linear Quadratic
(LQ) differential game, where the environment can be modeled by a set of a linear differ-
ential equations and the cost function can be modeled as a function containing just affine
quadratic terms, the coupled HJB equations are reduced to a coupled set of Differential
Riccati Equations (DRE) or Algebraic Riccati Equations (ARE).
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3.4 LQ Cooperative Differential Game
In a two-players cooperative differential game, the Player 1 and the Player 2 cooperate in
order to achieve their objectives. The objective of each player is the minimization of its
quadratic cost function
J1(x0,u1) = xT(tf )Q1(tf )x(tf ) +
∫ tf
0
xT(t)Q1x(t) +uT1 (t)R1u1(t)dt, (3.3a)
J2(x0,u2) = xT(tf )Q2(tf )x(tf ) +
∫ tf
0
xT(t)Q2x(t) +uT2 (t)R2u2(t)dt, (3.3b)
subject to
x˙(t) =Ax(t) +B1u1(t) +B2u2(t), x(0) = x0 (3.4)
where the weighting matricesQ1(tf ),Q1,Q2(tf ),Q2 ∈Rn×n are assumed to be symmet-
ric positive semidefinite, and R1 ∈ Rm1×m1 and R2 ∈ Rm2×m2 are symmetric and positive
definite. The objectives can be possibly conflicting. The players can communicate and can
also enter into binding agreements. It is assumed that they cooperate in order to achieve
their objectives and that each player has all the informations on the state dynamics and cost
functions of its opponent. The control strategies u1(·) and u2(·) can be chosen arbitrarily
from the sets U1, U2 in order to have a well-posed problem.
3.4.1 Background
Let consider a linear time-invariant system
x˙(t) =Ax(t) +Bu(t), x(0) = x0 (3.5)
where x(t) ∈ Rn is the state vector and u(t) ∈ Rm is the input vector. Given an initial
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condition x0, the finite time horizon LQ regulator problem is the computation of the control
input u(t), t ∈ [0, tf ] which minimizes a quadratic cost function
J(x0,u, tf ) = xT(tf )Q(tf )x(tf ) +
∫ tf
0
xT(t)Qx(t) +u(t)TRu(t)dt (3.6)
where the state weighting matrices Q(tf ),Q ∈ Rn×n are symmetric and positive semi-
definite and the input weighting matrixR∈Rm×m is assumed to be symmetric and positive
definite. The control goal is to keep x(t) close to the origin, especially at the final time
tf , by using a little control effort u(t). The cost function (3.6) is minimized, under the
assumption that the state x(t) is fully accessible for measurements at all time, by using the
optimal feedback control law
u(t)∗ =−R−1BTK(t)x(t), (3.7)
where K(t) ∈ Rn×n is the solution of the following so-called continuous time matrix
Differential Riccati Equations (DRE):
K˙(t) =−ATK(t)−K(t)A+K(t)BR−1BTK(t)−Q,
K(tf ) =Q(tf ).
(3.8)
The minimum cost achieved with the optimal feedback control law is xT0K(0)x0.
In the infinite time horizon case the terminal cost condition is negligible and the cost
function (3.6) becomes
J(x0,u) = lim
tf→∞
J(x0,u, tf ) (3.9)
with Q(tf ) = 0 and the state weighting matrices factored as Q = CTC ∈ Rn×n and
R ∈ Rm×m are respectively positive semi-definite e definite. In that case, the optimal
feedback control law is given by
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u(t)∗ =−R−1BTK∞x(t) (3.10)
where the matrixK∞ ∈Rn×n is the nonnegative-definite solution of the Algebraic matrix
Riccati Equation (ARE)
ATK∞+K∞A+Q−K∞BR−1BTK∞ = 0. (3.11)
Provided that the pair (A,B) is stabilizable and the pair (C,A) is detectable, a unique
nonnegative definite solution to the ARE (3.11) exists and it is finite. If (C,A) is ob-
servable K∞ is positive definite. The optimal feedback contro law (3.10) then generates
an asymptotically stable closed-loop system and the minimal value of the cost function is
achieved, that is x(0)TK∞x(0).
3.4.2 Pareto Strategy
The cooperative optimization problem (3.3)-(3.4) can be written as a multi-objective opti-
mization problem:
min
u
J(x0,u) = [J1(x0,u1),J2(x0,u2)] (3.12)
subject to (3.4).
The cost that one specific player incurs is not uniquely determined and, depending on
how the players choose to divide their control efforts, a player can incur different minima.
The so-called Pareto efficient solution is based on this premise and the solution is determined
when the cost incurred by all players simultaneously cannot be improved.
Definition 1. A set of control strategies uˆ = (uˆ1, uˆ2) ∈ U is called Pareto efficient if the
set of inequalities
J1(x0,u1)≤ J1(x0, uˆ1)
J2(x0,u2)≤ J2(x0, uˆ2)
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where at least one of the inequalities is strict, does not count for any solution u ∈ U .
The corresponding point J(x0, uˆ) = (J1(x0, uˆ1),J2(x0, uˆ1)) ∈ R2 is called Pareto solution.
The set of all Pareto solutions is called Pareto frontier, shown in Fig. 3.1.
J1
J2
Pareto frontier
Figure 3.1: Pareto frontier.
Pareto solution is therefore never dominated and, for that reason, it is called an un-
dominated solution. Typically, there is always more than one Pareto solution, because the
dominance is the property that generally does not provide a total ordering. In the particu-
lar case of two players, cooperative linear quadratic differential game, Pareto solution have
a simple characterization depending on a set of parameters defined as
A := {α = (α1,α2) | α1,α2 ≥ 0, α1 +α2 = 1}. (3.13)
Lemma 1. Let αi ∈ (0,1), with ∑Ni=1αi = 1. If γˆ ∈ Γ is such that
γˆ ∈ argmin

N∑
i=1
αiJi(γ)
 (3.14)
then γˆ is Pareto efficient.
In the Lemma 1, no convexity condition has been used on Ji and on Γi. The following
lemma states that, under some convexity assumptions on the cost function, alls Pareto-
efficient strategies can be obtained by considering the minimization problem (3.14).
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Lemma 2. Assume that the strategy spaces Γi, i= 1,2 are convex. Moreover, assume that
the cost functions Ji are convex. Then, if γˆ is Pareto efficient, there exists α ∈A, such that
for all γ ∈ Γ
N∑
i=1
αiJi(γ)≥
N∑
i=1
αIJi(γˆ) (3.15)
The combination of the results from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, leads to the following
theorem.
Theorem 1. Let αi > 0, i= 1,2 satisfy
∑N
i=1αi = 1. If γˆ ∈ Γ is such that
γˆ ∈ argmin
γ∈Γ

N∑
i=1
αiJi(γ)
 ,
then γˆ is Pareto efficient. Moreover, if Γi is convex and Ji is convex for all i= 1,2 then
for all Pareto efficient γˆ there exist α ∈ A, such that
γˆ ∈ argmin
γ∈Γ

N∑
i=1
αiJi(γ)
 .
Let consider, as a particular case, the LQ differential game, then an immediate corollary
from Theorem 1 is given below.
Corollary 1. Consider the optimization problem (3.12). The set of all cooperative Pareto
solutions is given by
(J1(u∗(α)),J2(u∗(α))) where α ∈ A.
The corresponding Pareto-efficient strategy is obtained as
u∗(α) = argmin
u∈U
αJ1 + (1−α)J2
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subject to
x˙(t) =Ax(t) +B1u1(t) +B2u2(t).
Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 show that, in order to find all cooperative solutions for the
cooperative LQ differential game, it has to be solved an optimal linear regulator problem
which depends on a parameter α. From Section (3.4.1), the existence of the solution for
this problem is related to the existence of the solutions of Riccati Equations while the
corresponding Pareto frontier is a smooth function of α. The so-called Bargaining theory
is the theory thanks to which it is possible to choose the best Pareto solution [50, 51].
The Bargaining Theory deals with the situations in which the players can realize, through
the cooperation, other outcomes better than the ones in case they do not cooperate. This
noncooperative outcome is called the threatpoint.
3.5 LQ Noncooperative Differential Game
In noncooperative nonzero-sum LQ differential game, the objective of each player is to
minimize the corresponding quadratic cost function
J1(x0,u1,u2, tf ) = xT(tf )Q1(tf )x(tf ) +
∫ tf
0
xT(t)Q1x(t) +uT1 (t)R11u1(t) +uT2 (t)R12u2(t)dt,
(3.16a)
J2(x0,u1,u2, tf ) = xT(tf )Q2(tf )x(tf ) +
∫ tf
0
xT(t)Q2x(t) +uT1 (t)R21u1(t) +uT2 (t)R22u2(t)dt,
(3.16b)
subject to
x˙(t) =Ax(t) +B1u1(t) +B2u2(t), x(0) = x0 (3.17)
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where the weighting matrices Q1(tf ),Q1,Q2(tf ),Q2 ∈ Rn×n, R21 ∈ Rm1×m1 , R12 ∈
Rm2×m2 are symmetric and R11 ∈Rm1×m1 and R22 ∈Rm2×m2 are positive definite. In case
of infinite-planning horizon, the objective of each player is the minimization of the cost
function
J1(x0,u1,u2) = lim
tf→∞
J1(x0,u1,u2, tf ), (3.18a)
J2(x0,u1,u2) = lim
tf→∞
J2(x0,u1,u2, tf ) (3.18b)
with Q1(tf ) = Q2(tf ) = 0. The noncooperative aspect of the game implies that the
players are assumes to not collaborate to attain this goal. In this section, the following
shorthand notation is assumed
S1 =B1R
−1
11B
T
1 , (3.19a)
S2 =B2R
−1
22B
T
2 , (3.19b)
S12 =B1R
−1
11R21R
−1
11B
T
1 , (3.19c)
S21 =B2R
−1
22R12R
−1
22B
T
2 . (3.19d)
The model and the objective function are assumed to be common knowledge. The
admissible control inputs u1(·) and u2(·) belong to a restricted set that depends on the
information, η1(·) and η2(·) respectively, the players have on the game and on the set of
strategies, Γ1 and Γ2, in order to control the system.
3.5.1 Nash Strategy
In a noncooperative nonzero-sum differential game, Nash strategy consists of multiple play-
ers that try to minimize their own cost function by choosing a control input simultaneously.
Definition 2. An admissible set of control actions (u∗1,u∗2) is Nash equilibrium for two-
players game (3.3a)-(3.4) if, for all admissible (u1,u2), the following inequalities hold
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J1(x0,u∗1,u∗2)≤ J1(x0,u1,u∗2),
J2(x0,u∗1,u∗2)≤ J2(x0,u∗1,u2).
Nash equilibrium is defined such that there is no incentive for any unilateral deviation
by all the players. In general, there is not a unique Nash equilibrium. It can be easily
verified that, whenever a set of controls (u∗1,u∗2) is a Nash equilibrium for a game with cost
functions J1 and J2 respectively, these controls also constitute Nash equilibrium for the
game with cost functions α1J1 and α2J2 for every α1,α2 > 0.
A disadvantage of the open-loop equilibrium concept is that, if the actual state of the
game at some instant of the time t1 differs from the state implied by the equilibrium
actions (u∗1(0, t1),u∗2(0, t1)), in general the rest of the a priori designed equilibrium actions
(u∗1(t1, tf ),u∗2(t1, tf )) will not be equilibrium actions for the rest of the planning horizon.
The strategy spaces for feedback information games are defined as
Γ fb1 = {u1(0, tf ) | u1(t) = f(x(t))},
Γ fb2 = {u2(0, tf ) | u2(t) = f(x(t))}.
Let denote the subgame Γ (t1,xt1) as just the final part [t1, tf ] of the original game,
Γ (0,x0) (3.16)-(3.17), start at time t1 at arbitrary state xt1 .
Definition 3. The set of control inputs
u∗1(t) = γ∗1(t,x(t)), (3.20a)
u∗2(t) = γ∗2(t,x(t)). (3.20b)
constitute a feedback Nash equilibrium solution if the strategies provide Nash equilib-
rium for the subgame Γ (t1,xt1), for all t1 ∈ [0, tf ], and xt1 that are reachable from the
initial state x0.
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In case of linear feedback information games, the strategy spaces are defined as
Γ lfb1 = {u1(0, tf ) | u1(t) =K1(t)x(t)} (3.21a)
Γ lfb2 = {u2(0, tf ) | u1(t) =K2(t)x(t)} (3.21b)
where K1(t) ∈ Rm1×n and K2(t) ∈ Rm2×n are continuous functions and Nash equilib-
rium strategies (u∗1,u∗2) are within the strategy space Γ
lfb
1 ×Γ lfb2 .
Theorem 2. The two-player LQ differential game (3.16a) and (3.16b) has, for every initial
condition, a linear feedback Nash equilibrium if and only if the following set of coupled DREs
has a set of symmetric solutions P1(t) and P2(t) with t ∈ [0, tf ]
P˙1(t) =−(A−S2P2(t))TP1(t)−P1(t)(A−S2P2(t)) +P1(t)S1P1(t)−Q1−P2(t)S21P2(t),
P1(tf ) =Q1(tf ) (3.22a)
P˙2(t) =−(A−S1P1(t))TP2(t)−P2(t)(A−S1P1(t)) +P2(t)S2P2(t)−Q2−P1(t)S12P1(t),
P2(tf ) =Q2(tf ). (3.22b)
Moreover, in that case there is an unique equilibrium. The equilibrium actions are
u∗1(t) =−R11BT1 P1(t)x(t), (3.23a)
u∗2(t) =−R22BT2 P2(t)x(t). (3.23b)
The costs incurred by the players are xT0P1(0)x0 and xT0P2(0)x0, respectively.
In case of infinite-planning horizon, the set of permitted linear feedback strategies be-
comes
K := {(K1,K2) | (A+B1K1 +B2K2) is stable}. (3.24)
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where, u1(t) =K1x(t) with K1 ∈ Rm1×n and u2(t) =K2x(t) with K2 ∈ Rm2×n. The
stabilization constraint is imposed to ensure the finiteness of the infinite-horizon cost in-
tegrals (3.18a) and (3.18b) from the assumption that both players have a first priority in
stabilizing the state close to the origin. A necessary and sufficient condition to make sure
that the set (3.24) is not empty, is that the matrix pair (A, [B1 B2]) is stabilizable.
Consider the set of coupled AREs
(A−S2P2)TP1 +P1(A−S2P2)−P1S1P1 +Q1 +P2S21P2 = 0, (3.25a)
(A−S1P1)TP2 +P2(A−S1P1)−P2S2P2 +Q2 +P1S12P1 = 0. (3.25b)
The feedback Nash equilibrium is completely characterized by symmetric stabilizing
solutions of the equations (3.25a) and (3.25b). That is, by symmetric solutions (P1,P2)
which the closed-loop system matrix (A−S1P1−S2P2) is stable for.
Theorem 3. Let (P1,P2) be a symmetric stabilizing solution of the equations (3.25a) and
(3.25b) and let define
K∗1 =−R−111 BT1 P1, (3.26a)
K∗2 =−R−122 BT2 P2. (3.26b)
then (K∗1 ,K∗2) is a feedback Nash equilibrium for two-player linear quadratic differential
game (3.18a) and (3.18b). Moreover, the costs, incurred by Player 1 and Player 2 playing
these control strategies, are respectively xT0P1x0 and xT0P2x0. Conversely, if (K∗1 ,K∗2) is
a feedback Nash equilibrium, there exists a symmetric stabilizing solution (P1,P2) of the
equations (3.25a) and (3.25b) such that K∗1 =−R−111BT1 P1 and K∗2 =−R−122 BT2 P2.
3.6 Differential Games as Formation Flight
The spacecraft formation flying is defined as [55, 56]: a set of more than one spacecraft in
which any of the spacecraft dynamic states are coupled through a common control law.
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This coupling can be in translational and/or rotational degrees of freedom and in position
and velocity. In particular, at least one member of the set must track a desired state profile
relative to another member, and the associated tracking control law must at the minimum
depend upon the state of this member.
The formation flying architecture can be divided in five basic typology: Multiple-Input,
Multiple-Output (MIMO), Leader/Follower (L/F), Virtual Structure (VS), Cyclic and Be-
havioral.
• Multiple-Input, Multiple-output
In the Multi-Input Multi-Output (MIMO) architectures, formation controllers are
designed using a dynamic model of the entire formation. That is, the formation is
treated as a multiple-input multiple-output plant. Within this problem formulation,
all methods of modern control theory may be applied to formation control.
• Leader/Follower
The leader/follower (L/F) architectures is the most studied architecture for formation
flying control. The Leader/Follower has also been referred to as Chief/Deputy and
with traditional terminology, two spacecraft rendezvous.
The traditionally L/F architecture uses a hierarchical arrangement of the individual
spacecraft controllers that reduces formation control to individual tracking problems.
Traditionally the L/F architecture is a single/layer in which all the spacecraft follow
the same leader. The other common architecture considered is a string or chain, in
which each spacecraft follows the preceding one.
• Virtual Structure
In the Virtual Structure (VS) architecture, the spacecraft behaves as a rigid bodies,
embedded in larger virtual rigid body (or structure). In particular the overall motion
of the virtual structure and the constant, specified positions and orientations of the
spacecraft within it are used to generate reference trajectories for the spacecraft to
track using the individual spacecraft controllers. Two type of the virtual structure
can be identify: iterated VS (IVS) and Guidance VS.
In IVS, a formation template is fit to the current spacecraft positions at each time
step. The spacecraft then track desired states with respect to the fitted template. The
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second type of VS, called Guidance VS (GVS) consists of an initial structure fitting
step, follows by prescribed motion of the structure to generate desired spacecraft
trajectories. GVS is not formation flying control because spacecraft states are not
coupled. However, if the virtual structure is referenced to a real spacecraft, then
GVS becomes a type of the L/F formation flying control algorithm with reference
trajectories provided by the virtual structure.
• Cyclic
A formation controller in the Cyclic architecture is formed by connecting individual
spacecraft controllers. Cyclic differs from L/F in that the controller connections are
not hierarchical.
• Behavioral
The Behavioral architecture combines the output of multiple controllers designed
for the achieving different and possibly competing behaviors. For example, an L/F
algorithms plus a repulsive potential field centers on each spacecraft is a Behavioral
algorithm consisting of a maintain-formation and collision avoidance behaviors.
The advantages and disadvantages of the various formation flying architectures are
discussed only for the MIMO, L/F and Cyclic. The VS algorithms are either L/F and
Cyclic depending on the implementation. Also, Behavioral algorithm are combinations of
MIMO, L/F and Cyclic algorithms.
The primary advantages of the MIMO architecture are optimality and stability (follow
directly from the MIMO synthesis). MIMO algorithm also have the highest information
requirements. Typically, each spacecraft must know the entire formation state. MIMO
algorithms are not robust to local failures.
In the L/F architecture the formation control is reduced to individual tracking problem
and each spacecraft only needs information about its leaders. This fact also simplifies the
formation coordination. Regarding the L/F robustness, if a spacecraft fails, then only its
follower is affected. By reassigned the followers, the immediate effect of the failure can be
minimized.
The cyclic algorithms lies between the MIMO and L/F architectures. By allowing non-
hierarchically connections between the individual spacecraft controllers. Cyclic algorithms
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can perform better than L/F algorithm and distribute control effort more evenly. Cyclic
algorithms can be also decentralized, in the sense that there is neither a coordinating agent
nor instability resulting from single point failures. The two primary drawbacks of there
algorithm are that the stability of these algorithm is poorly understood and that in many
cases the information requirements are as great as for MIMO algorithms. However, Cyclic
algorithms are generally, still more robust than MIMO algorithms.
The relative guidance optimal control problem is inserted in a L/F spacecraft formation
flight control problem.
3.6.1 Relative Guidance and Control
Guidance is the process of state trajectory planning, in real-time, for both the translational
and rotation of spacecraft. This involves computing desired set translational and rotational
states and corresponding control forces and torques as a function of time. Control, or more
specifically feedback control, is responsible for following these trajectories based on the
real-time states updates. The relative guidance and control of autonomous spacecraft are
in four based application ares:
• Planetary Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL)
• Proximity Operations for primitive bodies
• Autonomous Rendezvous and Docking (AR&D)
• Autonomous Inspection and Servincing (AIS)
In each of this application the guidance problem can be posed as an optimal control
problem with dynamics describing the motion of the spacecraft and constraints on the
spacecraft state and controls. Then, a Generic Autonomous Spacecraft Guidance Optimal
Control Problem can be expressed generically as follows:
min
tf ,u
gb(x(tf )) +
∫ tf
0
gi(x(t),u(t))dt,
subjected to the following: for all t ∈ [0, tf ],
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x˙(t) = f(t,x(t),u(t)),
u(t) ∈U(t),
x(t) ∈X(t),
where x ∈ Rn is the state of the spacecraft, u ∈ Rm is the control input, t is the time,
f : Rn+m+1→ Rn defines the dynamics, and U : R→ Rm and X : R→ Rn are set-valued
maps defining spacecraft control and state constraints.
Due to the existence of system dynamics and constraints, the resulting optimal control
problem must be solved numerically, via optimization algorithm after a proper discretiza-
tion. This requires computation of solutions to a complex optimization problem on-board
in real-time, implying that solution algorithms must be:
• Robust: Given that feasible solution, exist, an optimal is desired
• Real time implementable: Algorithms must be implemented and executed on
real-time processors in a reasonable amount of time
• Verifiable: There must be design the metrics that accurately describes the perfor-
mance and robustness of G&C algorithms, with accompanying methods for verifying
these metrics.
One of the main relative guidance challenges is the extension of guidance techniques
to multiple collaborative spacecraft. This complicates problem formulation and solution
methods, rendering complex problems even more so when real-time solutions are demanded.
The difficulty lies in the coupling between the safety of each vehicle to the future trajectories
of all its neighbors. This is often resolved in literature by forming a hierarchically in
planning, in which one vehicle neglects its neighbors and develops a plan, the second then
develops a plan assuming the first’s path is fixed, the third design a path under the first
and second, and so on. However, the technique makes the assumption that all current and
future state information of each vehicle is freely communicable to all other vehicles. The
communication architecture is called distribuited if it demands full communication of state
and intent between all the vehicles, or centralized if one vehicle determines the plans of all
others vehicles and the information is relayed only to central agent. A number of method
55
has been developed to handle multiple spacecraft guidance, including multi agent [36],
passive/active relative orbit formulations and optimal reconfigurations, rigid-body o quasi
rigid-body rotation planning, potential-based methods and behavioral planning [31]. Much
of literature focus on a simple formation flight architectures, such as L/F formations. Then,
formation flight and collaborative decision making remain highly active ares of research.
In this thesis work, the differential game is the proposed approach to extend the guidance
optimal control problem to multiple collaborative spacecraft for AR&D operations. The
cooperative differential game has a distribuited communication architecture while in the
noncooperative differential game the communication between the players is not requested.
3.6.2 Literature Review
The zero-sum differential game strategies for pursuit-evasion in orbit problem are widely
used. In [16] a numerical algorithm is proposed for a three dimensional orbital pursuit-
evasion game. In [59] a pursuit-evasion orbital game approach is presented for satellite
interception and collision avoidance. In [32] the pursuit-evasion problem is solved by using
the linear and nonlinear relative equations of the motion and the SDRE control technique.
In [28, 29] the game theoretic approach, by using Nash and Stackelberg open-loop strategies
to control the post-docking interactions between a service and a target satellite, is presented.
In [17] a cooperative rendezvous control problem between two spacecraft, by applying a
genetic algorithm and simulated annealing, is proposed in an inertial reference frame by
considering the fuel mass variation.
In [68] the cooperative and noncooperative differential games, for a spacecraft rendezvous
and formation-flying, are rewritten in the nonlinear multi objective programming problem
by using the DFET method [75].
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Chapter 4
Two-player Game in Orbit
In this chapter the rendezvous problem between two active deputy spacecraft in LVLH
frame is formulated as a cooperative and noncooperative nonzero-sum differential game.
The relative equations of motion of the Deputy 1 and of Deputy 2 are written with respect
to the same chief by using the nonlinear equation of relative motion. The chief becomes,
in this context, only a virtual chief in order to have a reference orbit during the maneuver.
The solution is proposed by extending the State-Dependent Riccati Equation (SDRE)
method to the nonlinear nonzero-sum differential games.
In the first section, a game dynamic in LVLH reference frame is formulated in a state-
dependent coefficient (SDC) form by factorizing the nonlinear game dynamic into a linear-
like structure.
In the second and in third sections, the solutions of the two-deputies cooperative and nonco-
operative differential games in the SD form, are discussed with their own stability conditions
related to the LVLH game parametrization.
The implementation of the SD cooperative game is related to the on-line solution of the
ARE that is widely studied in literature for SDRE control synthesis. The solution of the
SD noncooperative differential game is related to the on-line solution of the coupled AREs.
Furthermore, three iterative algorithms are described by the linear time-invariant nonco-
operative game. The algorithms compute a sequence of matrices which converges to the
equilibrium solution of the game.
In the last section, several simulations are performed with different initial conditions by
introducing the mass variation due to the propellant consumption model of the two space-
craft.
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4.1 SDC Game Parametrization
The state-dependent strategies for the nonzero-sum differential game is developed by con-
sidering the theory on the design of the nonlinear feedback controllers via SDRE method
[12–14]. The SDRE method is widely used to control the relative equation of the motion in
an active-passive AR&D maneuver, see [18, 19, 46, 53, 65]. In this thesis work, the SDRE
method is used to extend the differential game theory to the nonlinear equation of relative
motion control for the cooperative AR&D maneuver.
The nonlinear equation of the relative motion, presented in Subsection 2.2.1, can be rewrit-
ten in a state space form, nonlinear in the state and affine in the control input, as
x˙= f(x) +B(x)u(t) (4.1)
with state vector x ∈ R6 and input control vector u ∈ R3 (see Subsection 2.2.1), such
that the vector fields f(x) :R6→R6 andB(x) :R6→R6×3,B(x) 6= 0 ∀x have the following
expressions
f(x) =

x˙
y˙
z˙
2f˙
(
y˙−y r˙r
)
+xf˙2− µ
r3d
(r+x) + µ
r2
−2f˙
(
x˙−x r˙r
)
+yf˙2− µ
r3d
y
− µ
r3d
z

, B(x) =
 03×3
I3×3
 (4.2)
where rd =
√
(r+x)2 +y2 + z2 is the deputy orbital radius. In a two spacecraft differ-
ential game, by denoting the equation of motion of the Deputy 1 and Deputy 2 relative to
a common chief as
x˙1 = f(x1) +B1(x1)u1(t), (4.3a)
x˙2 = f(x2) +B2(x2)u2(t), (4.3b)
then the nonlinear game dynamic can be written as the following difference
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x˙1− x˙2 = f(x1)−f(x2) +B1(x1)u1(t)−B2(x2)u2(t). (4.4)
where
f(x1)−f(x2) =

x˙1− x˙2
y˙1− y˙2
z˙1− z˙2
2f˙
[
(y˙1− y˙2)− (y1−y2) r˙r
]
+ (x1−x2)f˙2− µr3d1
(r+x1) + µr3d2
(r+x2)
−2f˙
[
(x˙1− x˙2)− (x1−x1) r˙r
]
+ (y1−y2)f˙2− µr3d1
y1 + µr3d2
y2
− µ
r3d1
z1 + µr3d2
z2

.
(4.5)
Defining the game state vector as x=x1−x2 ∈R6 the vector field (4.5) of the nonlinear
game dynamic can be rewritten as
f(x) =

x˙
y˙
z˙
2f˙
(
y˙−y r˙r
)
+xf˙2− µ
r3d1
(r+x1) + µr3d2
(r+x2)
−2f˙
(
x˙−x r˙r
)
+yf˙2− µ
r3d1
y1 + µr3d2
y2
− µ
r3d1
z1 + µr3d2
z2

. (4.6)
The State Dependent Coefficient (SDC) parametrization, also known as Extendend lin-
earization, is the process of factorizing a nonlinear system into a linear-like structure which
contains SDC matrices. The following proposition guarantees the existence of a non-unique
global SDC parametrization of the (4.6).
Proposition 1. Let f :Ω→Rn be such that f(0) = 0 and f(·) ∈Ck(Ω), k ≥ 1. Then, for
all x ∈ Ω, an SDC parametrization f(x) =A(x)x always exists for some Ck−1 ,matrix-
valued function A :Ω→ Rn×n.
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In a scalar system, the SDC parametrization is unique for all x 6= 0. In the multivariable
case it is not unique. The nonuniqueness of the SDC parametrization for multivariable
systems create additional degrees of freedom that are not available on other nonlinear
design methods and that can be used to provide a better design flexibility. By using SDC
parametrization, therefore, an input-affine nonlinear system, the satisfies the Condition 1
on f(x), can always be represented in SDC form. In the right-hand side of the (4.6), there
are terms that are function of the state x1 of the Deputy 1 and of the state x2 of the
Deputy 2 individually, but not function of the game state x. These terms prevent a direct
SDC parametrization since f(0) 6= 0. The proposed parametrization is obtained with a
mathematical manipulation of the terms of the (4.6) in function of x1 and x2, as expressed
below
− µ
r3d1
(r+x1) +
µ
r3d2
(r+x2)
=− µ
r3d1
x1 +
µ
r3d2
x2 +µr
(
1
r3d2
− 1
r3d1
)
=− µ
r3d1
(x+x2) +
µ
r3d2
x2 +µr
(
1
r3d2
− 1
r3d1
)
=− µ
r3d1
x+µ(r+x2)
(
1
r3d2
− 1
r3d1
)
=− µ
r3d1
x+µ(r+x2)
(
r3d1− r3d2
r3d2r
3
d1
)
=− µ
r3d1
x+µ(r+x2)
((rd1− rd2)(r2d1 + rd1rd2 + r2d2)
r3d2r
3
d1
)
=− µ
r3d1
x+µ(r+x2)
((r2d1− r2d2)(r2d1 + rd1rd2 + r2d2)
r3d2r
3
d1
(rd1 + rd2)
)
=− µ
r3d1
x+µ(r+x2)
((r2d1 + rd1rd2 + r2d2)
r3d2r
3
d1
(rd1 + rd2)
)(
(r+x1)2 +y21 + z21− (r+x2)2−y22− z22
)
=− µ
r3d1
x+αx ((2r+x1 +x2)(x1−x2) + (y1 +y2)(y1−y2) + (z1 + z2)(z1− z2))
=− µ
r3d1
x+αx(βxx+βyy+βzz) (4.7)
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where the time-variant parameters are introduced
αx = µ(r+x2)
((r2d1 + rd1rd2 + r2d2)
r3d2r
3
d1
(rd1 + rd2)
)
, (4.8a)
βx = (2r+x1 +x2), (4.8b)
βy = (y1 +y2), (4.8c)
βz = (z1 + z2). (4.8d)
A similar mathematical manipulation is applied on the terms in function of y1, y2, z1
and z2 that becomes
− µ
r3d1
y1 +
µ
r3d2
y2
=− µ
r3d1
(y+y2) +
µ
r3d2
y2
=− µ
r3d1
y+µy2
(
1
r3d2
− 1
r3d1
)
=− µ
r3d1
y+αy(βxx+βyy+βzz); (4.9)
− µ
r3d1
z1 +
µ
r3d2
z2
=− µ
r3d1
(z+ z2) +
µ
r3d2
z2
=− µ
r3d1
z+µz2
(
1
r3d2
− 1
r3d1
)
=− µ
r3d1
z+αz(βxx+βyy+βzz) (4.10)
where
αy = µy2
(r2d1 + rd1rd2 + r
2
d2)
r3d2r
3
d1
(rd1 + rd2)
, (4.11a)
αz = µz2
(r2d1 + rd1rd2 + r
2
d2)
r3d2r
3
d1
(rd1 + rd2)
. (4.11b)
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The SDC game dynamic is
x˙=A(x)x+B1(x)u1(t) +B2(x)u2(t). (4.12)
where the SDC matrices is
A(x) =

0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1(
f˙2− µ
r3d1
+αxβx
) (
−2f˙ r˙r +αxβy
)
αxβz 0 2f˙ 0(
2f˙ r˙r +αyβx
) (
f˙2− µ
r3d1
+αyβy
)
αyβz −2f˙ 0 0
αzβx αzβy
(
− µ
r3d1
+αzβz
)
0 0 0

,
(4.13a)
B1(x) =
 03×3
I3×3
 , B2(x) =
 03×3
−I3×3
 . (4.13b)
The system-theoretic definitions of the differential game theory, in cooperative and
noncooperative cases, associated with the SDC form of game dynamic (4.12), become a
pointwise definition in x. The scenario of the differential game in LVLH frame is represented
in Fig. 4.1.
4.2 SDC Cooperative Game
The cooperative two-players differential game, by using the SDC form of game dynamic,
can be defined as the minimization of the following state-dependent quadratic cost function
in an infinite planning horizon
Jc(x0,u1,u2,α) =
∫ ∞
0
xT(t)Qc(x,α)x(t) +uTc (t)Rc(x,α)uc(t)dt (4.14)
subject to (4.12) under the following cooperative state space form
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Chief
Deputy 2
Deputy 1
⇢1 ⇢2
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jˆ
iˆ
Figure 4.1: Deputy 1 and Deputy 2 in LVLH reference frame.
x˙(t) =A(x)x(t) +
[
B1(x) B2(x)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bc(x)
 u1(t)
u2(t)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
uc(t)
, x(0) = 0. (4.15)
The state-dependent symmetric weighting matrices are
Qc(x,α) = αQ1(x) + (1−α)Q2(x)≥ 0 ∀x ∈Ω, (4.16a)
Rc(x,α) =
 αR1(x) 0
0 (1−α)R2(x)
> 0 ∀x ∈Ω. (4.16b)
where Q1(x), R1(x) and Q2(x), R2(x) are the continuous state-dependent weighting
matrices of the Deputy 1 and of the Deputy 2, respectively. The SDC form (4.15) is ad-
missible for a two-players state-dependent cooperative differential game under the following
condition
Condition 1. The respective pairs {A(x),Bc(x)} and {C(x),A(x)} are pointwise stabiliz-
able and observable SDC parametrizations of nonlinear system (4.15) ∀x, where CT(x)C(x) =
Qc(x,α).
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A sufficient test for the stabilizability and the detectability in Condition 1, requires to
check that the state dependent controllability matrix
Mc(x) =
[
Bc(x) A(x)Bc(x) · · · An−1(x)Bc(x)
]
, (4.17)
has rank(Mc(x)) = n ∀x ∈Ω and the state-dependent observability matrix
Mo(x) =
[
CT(x) AT(x)CT(x) · · · (AT(x))n−1CT(x)
]
, (4.18)
has rank(Mo(x)) = n ∀x ∈Ω respectively. The detectability requirement is guaranteed
by ensuring that the C(x) is chosen positive semidefinite ∀x ∈ Ω for entire domain of
interest. Depending on the SDC parametrization (4.12), the following state-dependent
controllability matrix can be computed
[
Bc(x) A(x)Bc(x)
]
=

0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 −1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 −1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 −1
1 0 0 −1 0 0 0 2f˙ 0 0 −2f˙ 0
0 1 0 0 −1 0 −2f˙ 0 0 2f˙ 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0

,
(4.19)
where, by choosing the sub-matrix formed by the first three columns of the two blocks,
the rank(Mc(x)) = 6 and the stabilizability condition are guaranteed ∀x ∈Ω. The optimal
state-feedback cooperative control law there exists and it is
uc(x,α) =−Rc(x,α)−1BTc (x)P (x,α)x(t), (4.20)
whereK(x,α), under the Condition 1 is the unique, symmetric, positive-definite point-
wise stabilizing solution of the continuous time state-dependent ARE
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P (x,α)A(x) +AT(x)P (x,α)−P (x,α)Bc(x)Rc(x,α)−1BTc (x)P (x,α) +Q(x,α) = 0.
(4.21)
The resulting cooperative closed-loop SDRE-controlled trajectory for the two-players
differential game is
x˙(t) = [A(x)−Bc(x)R−1c (x,α)BTc (x)P (x,α)]x(t). (4.22)
where the SDC closed-loop matrix Acl(x) is pointwise Hurwitz ∀x (every eigenvalue
has strictly negative real part).
4.2.1 Algorithms for Solving AREs
The algorithm to solve ARE can be divide into two categories: the category of direct method,
that guarantees the correct solution of the ARE from the associated Hamiltonian matrix,
and the category of iterative method that determines an approximate solution from an initial
guess through consecutive iterations. In general, the iterative method is computationally
faster than the direct method. In the two categories, Schur and Kleimann algorithms have
been found particular use in applications.
The solution of the state-dependent ARE, corresponding to the solution of the ARE, eval-
uated at the current state and denoted by xk, is omitted in this section. The associated
linear Hamiltonian matrix is
H =
 A −BcR−1c BTc
−Qc −A
 ∈ R2n×2n. (4.23)
Under the Condition 1, a unique, symmetric positive definite solution of the SD ARE
there exists at each time step, while Hamiltonian matrix has no pure imaginary eigenvalue.
The orthogonal transformation U ∈R2n×2n puts Hamiltonian matrix in the real Schur form
L=UTHU =
 L11 L12
0 L22
 , (4.24)
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where the real parts of the spectrum of L11 are negative and the real parts of the
spectrum of L22 are positive. The transformation matrix can be conformably partitioned
in four n×n blocks
U =
 U11 U12
U21 U22
 . (4.25)
With respect of the notation and assumptions, the solution of the state-dependent ARE
at the current state xk is
P =U21U−111 , (4.26)
and the closed-loop spectrum is
σ(A−BcR−1c BTc P ) = σ(L11). (4.27)
Two distinct steps are involved in the Schur decomposition approach. The first one
is the reduction of the Hamiltonian matrix H ∈ R2n×2n to the ordered real Schur form
(4.24). The second one is the solution of the n×n linear matrix equation (4.26). During
the computation, the condition number of U11 is critical at each time step and conditioned
to the solution of the ARE.
In the category of the iterative method the Kleimann recursive algorithm [35] uses an initial
guess of the feedback gain matrix to obtain the solution to an ARE. By denoting K0 as
the initial condition at each time step, let suppose that the closed loop matrix A−BcK0
has all the eigenvalues with negative real parts. The algorithms can then be implemented
by defining Pi and Ki recursively as
Pi(A−BcKi) + (A−BcKi)TPi =−KTi RcKi−Qc, (4.28a)
Ki+1 =R−1c BTc Pi (4.28b)
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where Pi ≥ Pi+1 and P = limi→∞Pi. Furthermore, ||Pi+1−P || ≤ c||Pi−P ||, c > 0
implies that the convergence of the algorithm is quadratic, contrary to most other iterative
algorithms whose convergence is linear. Initial guess of the feedback gain matrix can be
generated by using any other available technique such as the pole placement. Alternatively,
the previously discussed Schur algorithm can be used to estimate the initial guess.
Schur decomposition methods require about 75n3 computations [2], while Kleimann algo-
rithms require 6n3 calculations per iteration [49].
Generally, in an application, a combination of Schur and Kleimann algorithms is used, as
Schur algorithm always find the correct solution to the ARE if it exists, whereas Kleimann
algorithm is faster when a good initial guess is available.
4.3 Noncooperative Game
In the state-dependent noncooperative nonzero-sum infinite planning horizon differential
game, the objective of the Deputy 1 and of the Deputy 2 is the minimization of their own
state-dependent quadratic cost functions
J1(x0,u1,u2, tf ) =
∫ ∞
0
xT(t)Q1(x)x(t) +uT1 (t)R11(x)u1(t) +uT2 (t)R12(x)u2(t)dt,
(4.29a)
J2(x0,u1,u2, tf ) =
∫ ∞
0
xT(t)Q2(x)x(t) +uT1 (t)R21(x)u1(t) +uT2 (t)R22(x)u2(t)dt
(4.29b)
subject to SD dynamic game (4.12) where the state-dependent weighting matrices of
the Deputy 1 and Deputy 2 have the following constraints
Q1(x), Q2(x)≥ 0 ∀x ∈Ω, (4.30a)
R12(x), R21(x)≥ 0 ∀x ∈Ω, (4.30b)
R11(x), R22(x)> 0 ∀x ∈Ω. (4.30c)
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The nonzero-sum Nash control law for the Deputy 1 and for the Deputy 2 are respectively
u1(t) =−R−111 (x)BT1 P1(x)x(t), (4.31a)
u2(t) =−R−122 (x)BT2 P2(x)x(t), (4.31b)
where (P1(x),P2(x)) are the pointwise stabilizing solutions of the state-dependent cou-
pled AREs
(A(x)−S2(x)P2(x))TP1(x) +P1(x)(A(x)−S2(x)P2(x))−P1(x)S1(x)P1(x)
+Q1(x) +P2(x)S21(x)P2(x) = 0, (4.32a)
(A(x)−S1(x)P1(x))TP2(x) +P2(x)(A(x)−S1(x)P1(x))−P2(x)S2(x)P2(x)
+Q2(x) +P1(x)S12(x)P1(x) = 0. (4.32b)
following the notation of Section 3.5. The set of the noncooperative stabilizing control
laws for game dynamic (4.12) is not empty under the following assumption
Condition 2. The pairs (A(x), [B1(x) B2(x)]) is pointwise stabilizable ∀x ∈Ω.
The Condition 2 is verified as the stabilizability condition in the cooperative game (4.19).
The state-dependent closed-loop trajectory for the noncooperative nonzero-sum differential
game, where the Deputy 1 and Deputy 2 choose Nash strategy is
x˙(t) = [A(x)−B1(x)R−111 (x)BT1 (x)P1(x)−B2(x)R−122 (x)BT2 (x)P2(x)]x(t). (4.33)
4.3.1 Algorithms for Solving Coupled AREs
In [11, 20, 25, 34, 41] the solution of the coupled ARE has been approached by means of
an iterative procedure. Three different iterative schemes in [20] are proposed in order to
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calculate the feedback two-players Nash equilibrium by solving the coupled AREs (4.32).
The convergence, resulting from these iterative algorithms, has to be determined yet.
The first iterative algorithm has been introduced in [41] and is Lyapunov type iterative
algorithm. At each time step, once the state x is fixed an iterative solution is found by
solving two decoupled algebraic Lyapunov equations.
Algorithm 1
• Step 1 : Let i= 0. Determine the stabilizing solution P 01 of the ARE
ATP 01 +P 01A−P 01S1P 01 +Q1 = 0.
Determine the stabilizing solution P 02 (xk) of the ARE
(A−S1P 01 )TP 02 +P 02 (AS1P 01 ) +Q2 +P 01 +S12P 01 −P 02 +S2P 02 = 0.
• Step 2 : Compute the closed loop matrix
Aicl =A−S1P i1−S2P i2
and determine solutions of the algebraic Lyapunov equations
Ai
T
cl P
i+1
1 +P i+11 Aicl =−(Q1 +P i1S1P i1 +P i2S21P i2),
Ai
T
cl P
i+1
2 +P i+12 Aicl =−(Q1 +P i2S2P i2 +P i1S12P i1).
• Step 3 : If the matrices (P i1,P i2) have converged end of algorithm otherwise repeat
Step 2.
In the Algorithm 1 the matrix Aicl has to be stable ∀i. In case the stability condition
is violated at a certain iteration, this might indicate that the iteration does not have an
appropriate solution.
The second iteration algorithm proposed is based on Newton-Rapson method. At each
iteration of the algorithm, a set of linear equations Gx= d needs to be solved. Notice that
the matrices (P i1,P i2) are symmetric and then the number of linear equations that has to
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be solved is reduced .
Algorithm 2
• Step 1 : Let i = 0. Determine (P 01 ,P 02 ) such that the matrix A−S1P 01 −S2P 02 is
stable.
• Step 2 : Determine the solutions of the linear matrix equations
(A−S1P i1−S2P i2)TP i+11 +P i+11 (A−S1P i1−S2P i2) +P i+12 (−S2P i1 +S21P i2)
+ (−P i1S2 +P i2S21)P i+12 +P i2S2P i1 +P i1S2P i2 +P i1S1P i1 +Q1−P i2S21P i2 = 0,
(A−S1P i1−S2P i2)TP i+12 +P i+12 (A−S1P i1−S2P i2) +P i+11 (−S1P i2 +S12P i1)
+ (−P i2S1 +P i1S12)P i+11 +P i1S1P i2 +P i2S1P i1 +P i2S2P i2 +Q2−P i1S12P i1 = 0.
• Step 3 : If the matrices (P i1,P i2) have converged end of algorithm otherwise repeat
Step 2.
The third and last iterative algorithm in order to solve the coupled ARE for computing
Nash equilibrium is Riccati type iterative algorithm. In [11], it is provided that this algo-
rithm behaves better than the previous algorithm, both in terms of convergence speed and
detection of a stabilizable solution wherease it exists. The iterative procedure is based on a
decoupling of the (4.32) and, at each iteration of this algorithm, two standard AREs needs
to be solved.
Algorithm 3
• Step 1 : Let i = 0. Determine the semidefinite positive matrices (P 01 ,P 02 ) such that
the matrix A−S1P 01 −S2P 02 is stable
• Step 2 : Determine the stabilizing (P i+11 ,P i+12 ) solutions of the AREs
(A−S2P i2)TP i+11 +P i+11 (A−S2P i2)−P i+11 S1P i+11 +Q1 +P i2S21P i2 = 0,
(A−S1P i+11 )TP i+12 +P i+12 (A−S1P i+11 )−P i+12 S2P i+12 +Q2 +P i+11 S12P i+11 = 0.
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• Step 3 : If the matrices (P i1,P i2) have converged end of algorithm otherwise repeat
Step 2.
To ensure that this algorithm is well-defined, then the standard condition for the ex-
istence of the unique, symmetric nonnegative-definite solution of the AREs appearing at
each iteration and assumed in [11, 73], can be rewritten in the SDC form.
Condition 3. The pairs (A(x),B1(x)), (A(x),B2(x)) and (C1(x),A(x)), (C2(x),A(x))
are respectively stabilizable and detectable ∀x∈Ω, where CT1 (x)C1(x) =Q1(x) and CT2 (x)C2(x) =
Q2(x).
The stabilizability condition is verified by computing the following SD controllability
matrices
Mc1(x) =
[
B1(x) A(x)B1(x)
]
=

0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 2f˙ 0
0 1 0 −2f˙ 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0

, (4.34)
Mc2(x) =
[
B2(x) A(x)B2(x)
]
=

0 0 0 −1 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 0
0 0 0 0 0 −1
−1 0 0 0 −2f˙ 0
0 −1 0 2f˙ 0 0
0 0 −1 0 0 0

, (4.35)
which have rank(Mc1(x)) = rank(Mc2(x)) = 6. The detectability condition is guaran-
teed by ensuring that the matrices C1(x) and C2(x) are chosen as positive semidefinite
∀x ∈ Ω. In the simulations the Algorithm 3, combined with Schur Kleimann algorithms
at each time step, as explained in Subsection 4.2.1, has been used for the computation
requirements. Two stopping conditions are imposed. The first one is the accuracy of the
solution of coupled ARE and the second one is the maximum number of iterations to have
an acceptable execution time.
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4.4 Simulation Results
In the simulations, the performance of the cooperative and noncooperative control laws is
evaluated and compared. The chief’s orbital elements around the Earth are the following
a= 11 000 Km, e= {0,0.3}, i= 70◦, Ω = 45◦, ω = 0, f(t0) = 0. (4.36)
Six different initial conditions in terms of orbit elements are considered for the Deputy
1 and the equivalent Cartesian states are resumed in function of two different chief’s orbit
eccentricity values. They are shown respectively in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2. The initial
conditions of the Deputy 2 are shown in Table 4.3.
Table 4.1: Deputy 1 cartesian initial condition with e= 0.
δe1 x1(0) (Km) y1(0) (Km) z1(0) (Km) x˙1(0) (Km/s) y˙1(0) (Km/s) z˙1(0) (Km/s)
δe= 0.01, δi= 0.01 rad −110 0 0 0 0.120 0.061
δe= 0.1, δi= 0.1 rad −1100 0 0 0 1.204 0.664
δe= 0.2, δi= 0.2 rad −2200 0 0 0 2.410 1.465
δΩ = δω = 0.01 rad −1.476 147.617 −103.356 2.658 ·10−6 2.658 ·10−4 6.624 ·10−4
δΩ = δω = 0.1 rad −147.131 1471.245 −1025.021 0.003 0.026 0.066
δΩ = δω = 0.2 rad −582.658 2912.806 −1998.634 0.021 0.104 0.261
Table 4.2: Deputy 1 cartesian initial condition with e= 0.3.
δe1 x1(0) (Km) y1(0) (Km) z1(0) (Km) x˙1(0) (Km/s) y˙1(0) (Km/s) z˙1(0) (Km/s)
δe= 0.01, δi= 0.01 rad −110 0 0 0 0.208 0.083
δe= 0.1, δi= 0.1 rad −1100 0 0 0 2.118 0.918
δe= 0.2, δi= 0.2 rad −2200 0 0 0 4.359 2.071
δΩ = δω = 0.01 rad −1.033 103.332 −72.350 3.622 ·106 3.622 ·10−4 9027 ·10−4
δΩ = δω = 0.1 rad 102.992 102.871 −717.515 0.004 0.036 0.090
δΩ = δω = 0.2 rad −407.860 2038.964 −1399.044 0.029 0.142 0.356
72
Table 4.3: Deputy 2 cartesian initial condition.
δe2 x2(0) (Km) y2(0) (Km) z2(0) (Km) x˙2(0) (Km/s) y˙2(0) (Km/s) z˙2(0) (Km/s)
δe= 9 ·10−4,
δi= 0.0001 rad,
δΩ = δω = 0.0017 rad
e= 0
−10.5274 25.0718 −17.5536 −2.5211 ·10−4 0.0115 6.2170 ·10−4
e= 0.3
−10.5146 17.5431 −12.2825 −4.3774 ·105 0.0198 8.4732 ·10−4
The control law performance has been evaluated over one chief’s orbit period T and
the simulations have been performed by using MatLab Simulink, where a 4th order Runge-
Kutta integration algorithm, with step size of T/1000 has been chosen. In the comparison,
the performance of the noncooperative control law has been evaluated taking into account
the case of the Identical Goal Game [63], that occurs when two players cooperate in order
to minimize the same performance function J1 = J2 (4.29). An automatic tuning procedure
of the weighting matrices coefficients has been performed in order to balance the propellant
consumption in function of the fuel mass of the two Deputies. The automatic tuning
procedure simulates one case and tries different coefficients’ combinations. The simulations
results are then compared and the optimal values are chosen. Two indices are used to
compare the performance at the end of the simulations:
• The final distance between the Deputy 1 and Deputy 2
ρ(T ) = ||ρ1(T )−ρ2(T )|| (4.37)
• Total control usage
∆vi =
∫ tf
0
ui(t)dt, with i= 1,2. (4.38)
Several simulations have been performed in order to analyze the performance of the
cooperative and noncooperative control laws. In particular, by introducing a mathematical
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model for propulsion system to compute the mass variation due to propellant consumption
during the maneuver, the control matrices becomes
B˜i(t) =
1
mi(t)
Bi(t), (4.39)
where mi(t) is the time-varying mass for the Deputy i with i = 1,2. By considering
the propellant consumption as the only cause of the mass variation, the spacecraft’s mass
changes according to the following model
dmi
dt =−
ui
g0Isp
, with i= 1,2. (4.40)
where Isp is the specific impulse and g0 is the gravity acceleration at the sea level
(for Earth, g0 = 9.8066 m/s2). The specific impulse is measured in seconds and changes
according to the engine technology. The typical values are reported from [48] in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Performance for the propulsion systems.
Technology Isp [s] T [N]
Cold gas 60−250 0.1−50
Chemical 140−350 0.1−12 000 000
Nuclear 800−6000 up to 12 000 000
Electrical 500−10 000 0.0001−20
Inspired by the strategies for on-orbit assembly of modular spacecraft [26], the initial
fuel mass and the thruster specific impulse for the Deputy 1 and Deputy 2 have been
chosen. The propulsion system is the same for the two deputies and the specific impulse
is the baseline value for the chemical propellant. The fuel masses have been chosen for
the hypothetical scenario where both the servicing and serviceable satellites are active and
both have to minimize the propellant consumption. The initial fuel masses are different for
the two Deputies. The values are reported in Table 4.5.
In the Test case 1, the performance of the cooperative and noncooperative control
laws has been evaluated by considering the constant fuel masses. The automatic tuning
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Table 4.5: Initial fuel mass and specific impulse in seconds
Fuel mass [Kg] Isp [sec]
Deputy 1 86 310
Deputy 2 50 310
procedure, by fixing α= 0.5 in cooperative control, has found the following set of weighting
matrices
Q1 =Q2 =
 1.2×10−1I3×3 03×3
03×3 3.2×103I3×3
 ,
R1 =R11 =R21 = 2.5×105I3×3,
R2 =R22 =R12 = 8×105I3×3.
Simulations’ results are expressed in terms of total control usage, whose values are shown
in Tables 4.6 and Table 4.7, and in terms of the final distance between the two Deputies,
whose values are shown in Table (4.8) and Table (4.9). The cooperative control law requires
a control usage greater than the noncooperative control law, for all the initial conditions.
The final distance between Deputy 1 and Deputy 2 is smaller in the cooperative case.
Table 4.6: Total control usage ∆v in m/s, Test case 1 with e= 0.
e= 0
Deputy 1 Deputy 2
Cooperative Noncooperative Cooperative Noncooperative
δe= 0.01, δi= 0.01 rad 196.7 171.8 181.8 158.9
δe= 0.1, δi= 0.1 rad 2143 1889 1981 1748
δe= 0.2, δi= 0.2 rad 4352 4187 4024 3568
δΩ = δω = 0.01 rad 276.7 238.8 255.8 220.8
δΩ = δω = 0.1 rad 3312 2867 3062 2650
δΩ = δω = 0.2 rad 6639 5743 6138 5315
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Table 4.7: Total control usage ∆v in m/s, Test case 1 with e= 0.3.
e= 0.3
Deputy 1 Deputy 2
Cooperative Noncooperative Cooperative Noncooperative
δe= 0.01, δi= 0.01 rad 204.6 183 181.1 169.2
δe= 0.1, δi= 0.1 rad 2358 2140 2180 1984
δe= 0.2, δi= 0.2 rad 4941 4540 4657 4198
δΩ = δω = 0.01 rad 200.2 173.5 1851 160.4
δΩ = δω = 0.1 rad 2452 2173 2267 1990
δΩ = δω = 0.2 rad 4919 4371 4547 5315
Table 4.8: Final distance in m between Deputies in Test case 1 with e= 0.
e= 0
ρ(T )
Cooperative Noncooperative
δe= 0.01, δi= 0.01 rad 0.334 0.388
δe= 0.1, δi= 0.1 rad 4.184 4.783
δe= 0.2, δi= 0.2 rad 9.983 11.35
δΩ = δω = 0.01 rad 0.2527 0.294
δΩ = δω = 0.1 rad 2.993 3.482
δΩ = δω = 0.2 rad 6.081 7.09
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Table 4.9: Final distance in m between the Deputies in Test case 1 with e= 0.3.
e= 0.3
ρ(T )
Cooperative Noncooperative
δe= 0.01, δi= 0.01 rad 0.906 1.002
δe= 0.1, δi= 0.1 rad 11.58 12.59
δe= 0.2, δi= 0.2 rad 28.57 30.96
δΩ = δω = 0.01 rad 0.504 0.547
δΩ = δω = 0.1 rad 5.932 6.749
δΩ = δω = 0.2 rad 12.04 13.77
In the Test case 2, the mass variation, due to the propellant consumption, has been
considered by using the model (4.40). The following weighting matrices have been resulted
by the automatic tuning procedure
Q1 =Q2 =
 4.5×10−3I3×3 03×3
03×3 3.2×103I3×3
 ,
R1 =R11 =R21 = 7.5×105I3×3,
R2 =R22 =R12 = 2.5×106I3×3.
In Tables 4.10 and 4.11, respectively for the cases e = 0 and e = 0.3, the total control
usage and the propellant mass consumption for the two Deputies for both cooperative and
noncooperative control laws are shown. Furthermore, in Tables 4.12 and 4.13, respectively
for the cases e= 0 and e= 0.3, the final distance between the two Deputies is shown. The
introduction of the mass variation, on the one hand improves the control performance in
terms of the control usage, on the other hand makes it worses in terms of the final distance
between the two Deputies, both in the cooperative and in the noncooperative cases.
The maneuver time to reach the proximity operations range, where the distance between
the two Deputies belongs to 10 m < ρ < 100 m [72], has been evaluated only for the Test
case 2. As shown in Table 4.14 and Table 4.15, where the simulations’s results are reported
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for all the initial conditions, the maneuver time for the cooperative case is less than the
maneuver time for the noncooperative case.In the Fig. 4.2, Fig. 4.3 and Fig. 4.4, Fig. 4.5,
the trajectories generated in Test Case 2 by the cooperative and noncooperative control
laws are shown. In the Fig. 4.6 and Fig. 4.7 the relative distance evolution between the two
Deputies during the maneuver in Test Case 2 is shown. The trajectories of the cooperative
and noncooperative control laws are similar. As shown in Fig. 4.6 and Fig. 4.7, the two
Deputies reach the same orbit both in cooperative and in the noncooperative case.
The results of the Test Case 1 and of the Test Case 2 suggest that the cooperative strat-
egy can be replace with the noncooperative strategy in the case of possible failure in the
communication between the Deputies. The main advantage of the cooperative strategy is
the computational time.
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Table 4.10: Test 2, control usage ∆v in m/s and propellant consumption mp(T ) in Kg.
e= 0
Cooperative Noncooperative
Deputy 1 Deputy 2 Deputy 1 Deputy 2
∆v mp(T ) ∆v mp(T ) ∆v mp(T ) ∆v mp(T )
δe= 0.01, δi= 0.01 rad 92.7 2.58 81.89 1.33 88.83 2.48 78.67 1.28
δe= 0.1, δi= 0.1 rad 1211 28.26 1016 12.21 114.6 27.01 964.8 13.6
δe= 0.2, δi= 0.2 rad 2803 51.79 2090 24.86 2622 49.69 1987 23.99
δΩ = δω = 0.01 rad 99.99 2.78 88.41 1.43 88.49 2.47 78.3 1.27
δΩ = δω = 0.1 rad 1326 30.41 1105 15.24 1176 27.58 988.1 13.87
δΩ = δω = 0.2 rad 2911 52.99 2149 25.34 2545 4876 1941 20.13
Table 4.11: Test 2, control usage ∆v in m/s and propellant consumption mp(T ) in Kg.
e= 0.3
Cooperative Noncooperative
Deputy 1 Deputy 2 Deputy 1 Deputy 2
∆v mp(T ) ∆v mp(T ) ∆v mp(T ) ∆v mp(T )
δe= 0.01, δi= 0.01 rad 122.3 3.39 108 1.75 111.7 3.1 98.71 1.6
δe= 0.1, δi= 0.1 rad 1620 35.53 1325 17.67 143.4 53.67 1187 16.16
δe= 0.2, δi= 0.2 rad 4134 63.92 2685 29.33 3521 58.99 2446 27.64
δΩ = δω = 0.01 rad 74.75 2.09 66.16 1.08 65.61 1.84 58.09 0.95
δΩ = δω = 0.1 rad 1046 25.23 8853 12.63 905.2 22.15 772 14.21
δΩ = δω = 0.2 rad 2205 45.44 1781 22.17 196.1 40.88 158.7 20.13
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Table 4.12: Final distance in m between the Deputies in Test case 2 with e= 0.
e= 0
ρ(T )
Cooperative Noncooperative
δe= 0.01, δi= 0.01 rad 2.321 9.673
δe= 0.1, δi= 0.1 rad 5.022 19.8
δe= 0.2, δi= 0.2 rad 15.52 23.17
δΩ = δω = 0.01 rad 5.674 21.46
δΩ = δω = 0.1 rad 23.24 49.44
δΩ = δω = 0.2 rad 27.02 55.4
Table 4.13: Final distance in m between the Deputies in Test case 2 with e= 0.3.
e= 0.3
ρ(T )
Cooperative Noncooperative
δe= 0.01, δi= 0.01 rad 0.5281 3.056
δe= 0.1, δi= 0.1 rad 14.52 11.31
δe= 0.2, δi= 0.2 rad 39.86 34.67
δΩ = δω = 0.01 rad 3.083 10.86
δΩ = δω = 0.1 rad 19.62 56.02
δΩ = δω = 0.2 rad 29.62 47.88
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Table 4.14: Test case 2, maneuver time for proximity operation range.
e= 0
tM
Cooperative Noncooperative
δe= 0.01, δi= 0.01 rad 0.671 0.751
δe= 0.1, δi= 0.1 rad 0.828 0.928
δe= 0.2, δi= 0.2 rad 0.838 0.983
δΩ = δω = 0.01 rad 0.712 0.827
δΩ = δω = 0.1 rad 0.856 0.989
δΩ = δω = 0.2 rad 0.873 0.991
Table 4.15: Test case 2, maneuver time for proximity operation range.
e= 0.3
tM
Cooperative Noncooperative
δe= 0.01, δi= 0.01 rad 0.607 0.668
δe= 0.1, δi= 0.1 rad 0.743 0.824
δe= 0.2, δi= 0.2 rad 0.786 0.836
δΩ = δω = 0.01 rad 0.630 0.730
δΩ = δω = 0.1 rad 0.785 0.935
δΩ = δω = 0.2 rad 0.787 0.940
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Figure 4.2: Cooperative 3d trajectories with e= 0.
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Figure 4.3: Cooperative 3d trajectories with e= 0.3.
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Figure 4.4: Noncooperative 3d trajectories with e= 0.
84
−200
−100
0
100
−100
0
100
200
−50
0
50
100
x[Km]y[Km]
z
[K
m
]
Deputy 1
Deputy 2
(a) δe= 0.01, δi= 0.01 rad.
−2000
−1000
0
1000
−1000
0
1000
2000
−500
0
500
1000
x[Km]y[Km]
z
[K
m
]
Deputy 1
Deputy 2
(b) δe= 0.1, δi= 0.1 rad.
−4000
−2000
0
2000
−4000
−2000
0
2000
4000
−1000
−500
0
500
1000
1500
x[Km]y[Km]
z
[K
m
]
Deputy 1
Deputy 2
(c) δe= 0.2, δi= 0.2 rad.
−20
−10
0
10 0
50
100
150
−100
−50
0
50
100
y[Km]
x[Km]
z
[K
m
]
Deputy 1
Deputy 2
(d) δΩ = δω = 0.01 rad.
−500
0
500
0
500
1000
1500
2000
−1000
−500
0
500
1000
x[Km]y[Km]
z
[K
m
]
Deputy 1
Deputy 2
(e) δΩ = δω = 0.1 rad.
−3000
−2000
−1000
0
0
2000
4000
6000
−2000
−1000
0
1000
2000
x[Km]y[Km]
z
[K
m
]
Deputy 1
Deputy 2
(f) δΩ = δω = 0.2 rad.
Figure 4.5: Noncooperative 3d trajectories with e= 0.3.
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Figure 4.6: Relative distance between Deputy 1 and Deputy 2 in Test case 2 with e= 0.
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Figure 4.7: Relative distance between Deputy 1 and Deputy 2 in Test case 2 with e= 0.3.
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Chapter 5
Multiplayer Game in Orbit
The study of the differential games involving multiple players is very limited because of
the difficulty in the formulation and in rigorous treatment. In the literature most of the
studies on the multiplayers differential games are concentrated on the multiple pursuers
and evaders scenario. In [39, 40] a hierarchical approach to multiplayer pursuit evasion
differential game with two dimensional dynamic is presented. In [9] a hierarchical approach
is presented where some evaders’ capability are higher than those of all pursuers in the en-
gagement. An optimized sequential approach for the multiplayer game is in [33]. Different
solutions are find in [37, 38, 42, 44] for zero sum differential game.
In [43] the optimal learning algorithm based on policy iteration is used to solve a multiplayer
nonzero-sum game without the requirement of exact knowledge of dynamical systems. In
[74] a near-optimal control scheme is proposed to solve the nonzero-sum differential games
of continuous time nonlinear systems by using the neural networks.
The multiplayer differential games can be viewed as a possible approach to the synchro-
nization of the relative motion among multiple spacecraft.
In the first section of this chapter a sequential approach is presented to have a relative
motion synchronization between multiple deputies by using a cooperative nonzero-sum dif-
ferential game. A possible application is an orbit-assembly of active modular spacecraft or
modular structures.
In the second section the simulation results are presented for the nonlinear and linear co-
operative differential games. A comparison between the trajectories obtained by using the
different linear approximations, such as HCW, LERM and VC equations, treated in the
Section 2.2, is shown.
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5.1 Sequential Strategy
A general nonzero-sum differential game with n players can be decomposed into n− 1 se-
quential games in the time, between two players that are closely engaged.
Given n initial conditions, under the previous assumption, the engagement between the
players does not occur at the same interval of time. The upper level of the strategy is the
determination a priori of a proper engagement scheme among the players. The lower level
of the strategy is the resolution of a two-player differential game. This can be viewed as a
natural hierarchical structure in decision-making between the players.
The upper level strategy can be determined considering the optimization of the two player
engagements time. Clearly, the number of the possible engagements between the players
increases with n. Given an engagement, the lower level strategy is obtained to have a
synchronization between the states xi of the two players and for identifying the terminal
state of the game. In order to solve the successive two-player differential game a common
state xcm between previous players must be considered together with its dynamic. The
Fig. 5.1 shows the block diagram of an open-loop sequential multiplayer differential game
strategy. A sequential game strategy is a simplified approach in order to reach a suboptimal
equilibrium in a multiplayer differential game.
Optimization on Engagement 
Player 1 
Player 4 
Player 3 
Player 2 
Two Players  
Game 1 
x1
x2
xcm
xcmTwo Players  
Game 2 
Two Players  
Game 3 
Player n 
Two Players  
Game n-1 
xcm
x3
x4
xn
Figure 5.1: Sequential multiplayer game strategy.
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5.1.1 On-orbit Assembly Strategy
From the space application point-of-view, the multiplayer differential game can be viewed as
a strategy for on-orbit assembly of modular spacecraft. The next-generation of human space
exploration program, in fact, should be designed for both sustainability and affordability.
The cost of the space exploration programs can be reduced through the use of flexible
infrastructures supporting various aspects of manned spaceflight.
The on-orbit assembly of separate launched spacecraft modules, is an equally important
component of the infrastructure enabling human access to space. New technologies and
architecture concepts have been developed that make the robotic autonomous assembly
more feasible today with respect to the past. Specifically the modular spacecraft design is
a key enabling a concept for robotic on-orbit and rendezvous assembly, because it reduces
the complexity of the task. Assembly separate modules, by docking them together, is
simpler than attaching individual trusses and solar panels, or assemblage large mirrors in
space.
In a classical strategy for on-orbit assembly and rendezvous, the chief or target spacecraft
is a passive vehicle that does not apply any control force while following its trajectory and
the second spacecraft is an active vehicle which is controlled in such a way to meet the
target spacecraft. In a cooperative maneuver both spacecraft are controlled and guided to
match the same position and velocity.
The two possible strategies are illustrated, in the case of multiple spacecraft in Fig. 5.2.
1 
3
1
Module 
Propulsione 
 
  System Launch 
2 
1
1
2
5 
3 
44 
Figure 5.2: Self assembly strategies.
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The multiplayer nonzero-sum differential game can be a possible approach to control
the cooperative maneuver between multiple modular spacecraft.
5.2 Simulations Results
The cooperative multiplayer differential game strategy, presented in the previous section,
has been tested for sequential terminal rendezvous operations. In the simulations, the
sample time has been set to T/1000 and 4th order Runge-Kutta integration algorithm has
been selected. The number of spacecraft used for the sequential game strategy test is 4.
Each spacecraft, at the beginning of the engagement, has a fuel mass of mprop = 90 Kg and
the specific impulse of Isp = 310 seconds. The mass variation in function of the propellant
consumption, introduced in Section 4.4, has been considered in the simulations.
The docking operation range has been considered to determine the final state of each two-
player game, ρ < 10 m [72], where ρ is the distance between the two deputies. At the end
of each game, the center of mass of the two deputies is considered as the common state
xcm =
m1(tf )x1 +m2(tf )x2
m1(tf ) +m2(tf )
(5.1)
where mi(tf ), with i= 1,2 is the final mass of the deputies and the time tf is the final
time of the two-player game. The engagement has been optimized by choosing the sequence
of the two-player game in order to minimize the maneuver time in each game.
A set of the weighting matrix coefficients has been chosen for the 3 sequential games in
order to minimize the propellant consumption and the maneuver time in each game. Pareto
parameter α is chosen for each game to have the same mass between the deputies at the
final time tf .
5.2.1 Nonlinear Cooperative Simulations
In this section the results for the nonlinear cooperative sequential games are presented. The
game parametrization is the same of the Section 4.4. The chief’s orbital elements around
the Earth are the following
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a= 11 000 Km, e= 0, i= 70◦, Ω = 45◦, ω = 0, f(t0) = 0. (5.2)
The length of the formation reconfiguration maneuver time is 3 chief’s orbital periods.
In Table 5.1, for each scenario, the parking orbital elements for each deputy are reported
with respect to the chief orbital elements.
Table 5.1: Scenarios in nonlinear multiplayer game.
Deputy 1 Deputy 2 Deputy 3 Deputy 4
Scenario 1 δe1 = 0.01, δi1 = 0.01 rad δe2 = 0.1, δi2 = 0.1 rad δe3 = 0.2, δi3 = 0.2 rad δe4 = 0.3, δi4 = 0.3 rad
Scenario 2 δΩ1 = δω1 = 0.01 rad δΩ2 = δω2 = 0.1 rad δΩ3 = δω3 = 0.2 rad δΩ4 = δω4 = 0.3 rad
Scenario 3 δe1 = 0.01, δΩ1 = δω1 = 0.01 rad δe2 = 0.1, δΩ2 = δω2 = 0.1 rad δe3 = 0.2, δΩ3 = δω3 = 0.2 rad δe4 = 0.3, δΩ4 = δω4 = 0.3 rad
Scenario 4 δe1 = 0.01, δi1 = δΩ1 = 0.01 rad δe2 = 0.1, δi2 = δΩ2 = 0.1 rad δe3 = 0.2, δi3 = δΩ3 = 0.2 rad δe4 = 0.3, δi4 = δΩ4 = 0.3 rad
The automatic tuning procedure is the same of the Section 4.4 and the following weight-
ing matrices has been found
Q1 =
 4.45×10−2I3×3 03×3
03×3 3×104I3×3
 ,
R1 =R2 = 6.6×106I3×3.
The simulations have been evaluated by considering the total control usage (4.38) and
the maneuver time to reach the docking range. The simulations results, for each scenario,
are reported in Table 5.2.
In Fig. 5.3 and in Fig. 5.4 the resulting three dimensional and two dimensional trajec-
tories of the deputies and of the centers of mass in each game are shown in the different
scenarios.
5.2.2 Linear Cooperative Simulations
In this section the results of the VC, LERM and HCW solutions for the cooperative se-
quential games have been evaluated. The dynamic of the game and of the deputies becomes
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Figure 5.3: Sequential nonlinear cooperative multiplayers game trajectories.
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Table 5.2: Three cooperative sequential game.
Cooperative
Game 1 Game 2 Game 3
∆v tf α ∆vcm ∆v3 tf α ∆vcm ∆v4 tf
Scenario 1 966.8 0.772 0.28 3257 1973 1.438 0.48 2907 2611 2.049
Scenario 2 1057 0.850 0.22 1762 741.8 1.705 0.25 1049 807.6 2.633
Scenario 3 1801 0.728 0.45 3361 3371 1.372 0.69 3173 4401 1.906
Scenario 4 1198 0.800 0.32 3026 2041 1.498 0.49 2759 2505 2.140
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Figure 5.4: Sequential nonlinear cooperative multiplayer game trajectories.
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linear time-variant in VC and LERM cases while, in case of HCW approximation, the dy-
namic becomes linear time-invariant. The nonzero chief’s orbital elements are expressed
below
a= 7500 Km, e= {0.001,0.01,0.1} (5.3)
and the deputies orbital elements are listed in Table 5.4. The solutions have been
evaluated only on the in-plane motion (xy) and on 2 chief’s orbital periods.
Table 5.3: Scenario in linear multiplayer game.
Deputy 1 Deputy 2 Deputy 3 Deputy 4
Scenario δe1 = 10−5, δω1 = 10−5 δe2 = 2 ·10−5, δω2 = 2 ·10−5 δe3 = 3 ·10−5, δω3 = 3 ·10−5 δe4 = 4 ·10−5, δω4 = 4 ·10−5
The following weighting matrices are resulting by the automatic tuning procedure
Q1 =
 1.5×10−4I3×3 03×3
03×3 6×102I3×3
 ,
R1 =R2 = 2.6×103I3×3.
The accuracy of the simulation results is then evaluated by considering for each coop-
erative sequential game the norm of the difference between ρHCW (t) and ρLERM (t), and
between ρV C(t) and ρLERM (t)
(t)HCW = ||ρHCW (t)−ρLERM (t)||, (5.4)
(t)V C = ||ρV C(t)−ρLERM (t)||, (5.5)
where by ρ(t) is denoted the distance between the two deputies during each game. In
Table 5.4 the results are reported by considering the average values. In Fig. 5.5, Fig. 5.6
and Fig. 5.7 the trajectories, in function of the eccentricity value, for the VC, HCW and
LERM game solutions respectively, are shown.
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Table 5.4: Average  in m.
Game 1 Game 2 Game 3
HCW VC HCW VC HCW VC
e= 0.001 0.009 0.004 0.8189 0.370 2.467 1.148
e= 0.01 0.04 0.09 7.03 2.63 27.19 14.60
e= 0.1 0.91 0.49 83.38 34.38 313.94 149.73
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Figure 5.5: Linear Cooperative game 2d trajectories with e= 0.001.
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Figure 5.6: Linear Cooperative game 2d trajectories with e= 0.01.
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Figure 5.7: Linear Cooperative game 2d trajectories with e= 0.1.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
A nonzero-sum differential game strategy has been applied to control the cooperative
maneuver for two active spacecrafts rendezvous problem. Two different strategies have
been used so that a comparison among the cooperative Pareto game and noncooperative
Nash game has been performed. Starting from the two players LQ differential game the-
ory, the nonlinear control laws have been developed by using state-dependent coefficient
parametrization of the game dynamic and the State-Dependent Riccati Equation (SDRE)
method. The cooperative and noncooperative control laws have the same performances, in
terms of control usage and final distance between the deputies. Nevertheless, the disadvan-
tage of using the noncooperative control law is an higher computational time, numerical
and convergence problems. In last part of the thesis work, the cooperative control law
for relative motion synchronization among many deputies has been developed by using a
sequential game approach. This solution is a suboptimal solution of the multiplayer game.
Finally, a comparison among the trajectories obtained by using the HCW, VC and LERM
equations, has been evaluated in close proximity range.
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